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WAIVING DUE PROCESS (GOODBYE):
STIPULATED ORDERS OF REMOVAL AND
THE CRISIS IN IMMIGRATION
ADJUDICATION*
JENNIFER LEE KOH**
In recent years, the federal government has deported a surprising
number of non-citizens through a little-known procedure called
stipulated removal, in which a non-citizen agrees to the entry of a
formal removal order while waiving the right to an in-person
hearing before an Immigration Judge. The federal government
has looked to stipulated orders of removal as a partial solution to
the mismatch between its enforcement goals and the resources of
the immigration court system-a mismatch that, many
commentators agree, has reached a state of crisis. Stipulated
removal arguably offers some benefits to both the non-citizen
and the government, insofar as the non-citizen stands to receive a
shorter time in immigration detention and faster removal, while
the federal government benefits from efficiency gains and
political rewards. This Article, the first academic piece to
examine stipulated orders of removal, draws from extensive
internal government documents and data obtained through the
Freedom of Information Act to examine the stipulated order of
removal program. It argues that stipulated orders of removal
under current law and practice should not function as a partial
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solution to the crisis in immigration adjudication. The Article
offers an in-depth examination of stipulated removal, which has
largely affected unrepresented non-citizens in immigration
detention centers who faced severe information deficits during
the removal process. Relying on both the illegal re-entry context
and the familiar Mathews v. Eldridge procedural due process
framework, this Article argues that the stipulated order of
removal program, as implemented thus far, violates due process,
and offers suggestions for reform.
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INTRODUCTION
Isaac Ramos had lived in the United States for nearly twenty
years, was married to a lawful permanent resident, and was father to
three United States citizen children when immigration authorities
detained him and placed him in removal proceedings.' Two days after
being transferred to the Eloy Detention Facility in Eloy, Arizona-
550 miles away from Bakersfield, California (where he was
apprehended)-Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE")
officers presented Mr. Ramos with a boilerplate form entitled
"Stipulated Request for Removal Order and Waiver of Hearing."'
The form contained a statement admitting to all the charges lodged
against him by ICE, as well as stipulations giving up Mr. Ramos's
right to a hearing before an Immigration Judge ("IJ"), his right to
apply for relief from removal, and his right to appeal the removal
order.
ICE Officer Christina Olsen, whose only Spanish language
instruction took place during her training to become an ICE agent,
met individually with Mr. Ramos, a Spanish speaker, to explain the
request for a stipulated removal order. 4 During her meeting with Mr.
1. United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. Id. at 676-77.
3. Id. at 677.
4. Id. at 678.
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Ramos, she asked Mr. Ramos a question in Spanish that she
understood to mean, "Do you want to fight your case or sign?"'
Several years later, when Officer Olsen was asked to repeat this same
sentence to a Spanish language interpreter in federal district court,
the interpreter indicated that the statement was "nonsensical in part"
and incapable of translation.' On the basis of his conversation with
Officer Olsen, Mr. Ramos signed the stipulated removal form.' Mr.
Ramos never had a lawyer during the process.' Neither Officer Olsen
nor any government representative ever reviewed Mr. Ramos's file to
determine whether he might be eligible for immigration relief or for
release from detention on bond.' Based purely on a review of the
preprinted form, which stated that Mr. Ramos waived his rights
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, an IJ found Mr. Ramos'
waiver of rights to be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent."o Within a
day, the IJ ordered Mr. Ramos deported, and authorities physically
removed him to Mexico." By receiving an IJ-issued removal order,
Mr. Ramos was barred from legally re-entering the United States for
at least ten years.12 A year and a half later, federal border agents
apprehended Mr. Ramos after he attempted to return to the United
States.13 Because of the prior removal order, he was criminally
prosecuted for illegal re-entry and sentenced to six and a half years in
federal prison.14
Isaac Ramos is one of a growing number of non-citizens in
immigration detention centers who have been deported through a
process known as stipulated removal.'" Over the past decade, the
5. Id.
6. Id. As the Ninth Circuit opinion noted, the district court held an evidentiary
hearing on Mr. Ramos's motion to dismiss the illegal re-entry charge, during which Officer
Olsen testified. Id. at 677-78.
7. Id. at 681.
8. Immigrants in removal proceedings are entitled to counsel of their choosing but
do not have the option of government-appointed counsel. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A)
(2006).
9. Ramos, 623 F.3d at 678.
10. Id. at 679.
11. Id.
12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A) (2006) (rendering inadmissible an alien who has
been previously ordered removed for periods of five, ten, or twenty years, depending on
whether the alien had a second or subsequent removal order or has previously been
convicted of an "aggravated felony," as well as on the timing of removal proceedings).
13. Ramos, 623 F.3d at 675.
14. Reply Brief for Appellee at 6, Ramos, 623 F.3d 672 (No. 09-50059), 2009 WL
6564884, at *4-5.
15. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2012) (detailing stipulated
removal).
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federal government has substantially expanded and experimented
with stipulated removal. Before 2003, a handful of stipulated orders
were recorded.16 But by fiscal year 2008, approximately 30,000
removal orders-nearly one-fifth of all removal orders issued by IJs
that year-were stipulated removal orders." And although the
practice across the country appears to have peaked in 2009, with some
decline since then,'" stipulated orders still constitute almost a third of
all removal orders issued by IJs in certain parts of the country.19 Non-
citizens who sign requests for stipulated orders of removal agree to
the entry of a formal order of removal against them while forgoing a
hearing before an IJ, and they waive other rights associated with
removal proceedings, such as the right to contest the grounds of
removal and the right to appeal the removal order.20
Stipulated orders of removal arguably offer benefits to both
sides. To non-citizens who do not wish to fight their removal cases,
agreeing to a stipulated order of removal offers them a faster removal
and therefore less time in detention. To the federal agencies tasked
with immigration enforcement and adjudication," stipulated removal
provides significant efficiency benefits, political rewards, and
potential enforcement clout. Stipulated removal orders move cases
more quickly through the removal and detention process. Moreover,
they are counted as formal removals, giving the government the
power to impose civil and/or criminal penalties if previously deported
persons re-enter the country in the future.'
16. Data received from Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
17. See infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
18. See LENNI B. BENSON & RUSSELL WHEELER, ENHANCING QUALITY AND
TIMELINESS IN IMMIGRATION REMOVAL ADJUDICATION 129 (2012), available at
http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/06/Enhancing-Quality-and-
Timeliness-in-Immigration-Removal-Adjudication-Final-June-72012.pdf (showing 36,533
stipulated removal orders entered in fiscal year 2009; 27,706 in 2010; and 14,846 in 2011).
19. See id. at 128 (showing that in fiscal year 2011, stipulated orders in Cleveland
accounted for thirty-two percent of removal orders issued by IJs, and stipulated orders in
Salt Lake City accounted for twenty-nine percent).
20. § 1003.25(b).
21. Several different federal agencies are charged with administering the immigration
laws and participate in the stipulated removal program. See generally infra Part III
(discussing implementation of stipulated removal). Where a specific agency is relevant,
this Article will refer to the particular agency in question. At times, however, the Article
refers generically to "federal immigration agencies" to discuss the actions of various
agencies collectively.
22. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a)(9)(A) (2006) (imposing civil bars to re-entry for
individuals ordered removed); 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2006) (describing elements of crime of
illegal re-entry following removal order).
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For individuals like Isaac Ramos, who are charged with removal
by ICE, the alternative to a stipulated order of removal involves
appearing for an in-person hearing before an IJ, often during
detention. Us, who preside over immigration courts that fall under
the direction of the Department of Justice, are responsible for
adjudicating deportation cases and process over 400,000 matters each
year.23 Over the past decade, policymakers, judges, and scholars alike
have identified a crisis in immigration adjudication, focusing on
questions such as the wide disparities in individualized decision-
making,2 4 bias in the selection process for adjudicators," an overall
dearth of professionalism,2 6 and severe resource constraints in the
system." The government's modern system of immigration detention,
too, has become the focus of intense criticism.2 8 At the same time, the
level of federal government resources devoted to enforcement has
expanded substantially, thereby enhancing the demand for the
services of the immigration courts and immigration detention
facilities.29
Do stipulated orders of removal offer a partial solution to the
mismatch between the federal government's enforcement goals and
23. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2011
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK B2 (2012) [hereinafter EOIR, FY 2011 YEARBOOK],
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy11syb.pdf (showing receipt of 393,185 matters in
fiscal year 2009; 392,888 matters in fiscal year 2010; and 430,574 in fiscal year 2011). EOIR
defines "matters received" as "the total number of proceedings, bond redeterminations,
and motions to reopen or reconsider received by the immigration courts during the
reporting period." Id. at B1.
24. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 303 (2007).
25. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 369, 374-75 (2006).
26. A number of federal appeals court judges have openly criticized the quality of IJ
decision-making. See, e.g., Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2004)
(criticizing the IJ's analysis as "one more indication of systemic failure by the judicial
officers of the immigration service to provide reasoned analysis for the denial of
applications for asylum."); see also Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench,
73 BROOK. L. REV. 467, 471 (2008) (arguing that crisis on immigration bench implicates
judicial ethics).
27. APPLESEED & CHICAGO APPLESEED, ASSEMBLY LINE INJUSTICE: BLUEPRINT
To REFORM AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION COURTS 1 (2009), available at
http://www.asserlaw.com/articles/article_164.pdf.
28. DORA SCHRIRO, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T
HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4
(2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf.
29. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2010
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 94 (2011) [hereinafter DHS, 2010
YEARBOOK], http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2010/ois yb_2010.pdf
(showing five-fold increase in number of removals from fiscal year 1996 to 2010).
480 [Vol. 91
STIPULATED ORDERS OF REMOVAL
the resource constraints of the immigration courts and detention
system? This Article argues that they do not, at least not under
current procedures and practices. At a descriptive level, the Article
draws from thousands of previously confidential government records
and data that were obtained through the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA") to provide a close view of the federal government's
expansion of the stipulated removal program. It highlights several
troubling features of the program, particularly for those who have
been disproportionately affected by stipulated removal: individuals
who did not have lawyers and were incarcerated in immigration
detention facilities, the overwhelming majority of whom were of
Latino descent. The Article then argues that the stipulated order of
removal program, as implemented since statutory and regulatory
changes in 1996 allowed its use on unrepresented non-citizens,
violates procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment. While
the Article critiques the government's use of stipulated removal to
date, it does not advocate for stipulated removal's abolition. It instead
advocates for small but meaningful administrative reforms to
ameliorate the due process problems associated with the program,
while recognizing that ICE's pro-enforcement culture and the
absence of comprehensive immigration reform are also responsible
for stipulated removal's deficiencies.
Stipulated removal constitutes part of a broader trend in the
immigration enforcement context, in which efficiency takes priority
over process. Since 1996, the civil immigration laws have set forth a
variety of streamlined procedures, in addition to stipulated removal,
which enable the government to deport non-citizens while avoiding
adjudication before the immigration courts.' Increasingly, ICE
directly issues removal orders that never come before IJs, and it has
become common to hear of individuals physically removed after
signing a piece of paper during an interview with an ICE officer.
Indeed, in fiscal year 2010, almost two-thirds of all removal orders
reported by DHS came directly from the Agency and were not issued
30. Other forms of removal employed in the civil immigration context include
expedited removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I) (2006) (indicating that certain
aliens arriving at ports of entry "shall" be ordered removed "without further hearing or
review"); reinstatement of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2006) and 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.8(a) (2012) (providing for removal, without right to immigration court hearing, for
non-citizens apprehended in the United States after the receipt of a prior removal order);
and administrative removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) (2006) and 8 C.F.R. § 238.1 (2012)
(applying to immigrants who are not lawful permanent residents and who have convictions
that are aggravated felonies).
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by IJs.3' A related set of procedures are followed when the criminal
courts act as immigration-related forums.3 2 The criminal justice
system has witnessed a rise in the use of various plea bargaining
arrangements with non-citizens to ultimately achieve immigration
enforcement goals in the form of both criminal sanctions and physical
removals. Examples include the conditioning of removal orders as
part of plea bargains in federal criminal prosecutions (for
immigration and non-immigration offenses)," and the use of fast-
31. See DHS, 2010 YEARBOOK, supra note 29, at 94 (showing 387,242 removals);
EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2010 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK D2, Q1 (2011), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy10syb.pdf (suggesting
that Us entered 138,864 removal orders that were not grants of voluntary departure).
32. It is worth acknowledging that the expansion of stipulated removal, a civil
immigration enforcement mechanism that amplifies the government's criminal
enforcement power for immigration violations, has implications for the growing literature
on the overlap between the criminal and immigration laws. See generally Jennifer M.
Chac6n, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135 (2009)
(discussing and theorizing the criminal prosecution of immigration-related offenses);
Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-
September 11th "Pale of Law," 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 639 (2004) (discussing
criminalization of non-citizens after September 11th and through proposals to involve
local law enforcement in immigration enforcement); Stephen Legomsky, The New Path of
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE.
L. REV. 469 (2007) (asserting that immigration law has adopted criminal law's punitive
aspects while rejecting criminal law's procedural protections); Peter Markowitz,
Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299 (2011) (arguing that Supreme Court
has rejected, and may further reject, traditional characterization of deportation as purely
civil in nature); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime and Sovereign
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006) (exploring convergence of criminal and immigration
laws, as well as implications of convergence for political theories of national membership).
Indeed, stipulated removal constitutes yet another example of what Stephen Legomsky
calls the "asymmetric incorporation" of criminal law into immigration law, in which the
policies and practices of criminal law have seeped into immigration enforcement, even
though immigration law has simultaneously failed to incorporate the procedural
protections of criminal law. See Legomsky, supra, at 494-96 (describing other forms of
"criminal-style plea-bargaining" in immigration law).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(5) (2006). Under a stipulated judicial order, a federal district
court judge has the authority to enter a removal order as a condition of a plea agreement,
probation, and/or supervised release. Id. The use of stipulated judicial orders of
deportation has appeared most prominently in several high-profile workplace raids of
immigrant workers. See Peter R. Moyers, Butchering Statutes: The Postville Raid and the
Misinterpretation of Federal Law, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651, 669-704 (2008) (describing
use of stipulated judicial orders of removal in conjunction with immigration raid on
Postville, Iowa meatpacking plant). Stipulated judicial orders under § 1228(c)(5) raise
several issues in common with stipulated orders of removal, including allegations of
pressure and government agents' reliance on misinformation and lack of access to counsel
in order to obtain concessions to final orders of removal. See id. at 687. A full discussion of
stipulated judicial orders of removal, entered at the same time as criminal proceedings and
under the authority of § 1228(c)(5), is outside the scope of this Article, which focuses
primarily on stipulated removal orders entered during the civil immigration enforcement
process pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d) (2006) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2012). This
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track pleas and group plea colloquies in illegal entry prosecutions in
certain border states.' In general, this trend towards efficiency at the
expense of process in both the civil and criminal contexts has
remained relatively under-examined in the legal scholarship. The
immigration literature generally centers on the quality of adjudication
in cases pending before Us. 5 Relatedly, the effect of immigration
enforcement's increasing entanglement with criminal law on the
criminal justice system itself has only recently gained the attention of
scholars. 6 This Article focuses exclusively on stipulated orders of
removal in immigration courts. In doing so, it supplies one missing
piece of a generally under-theorized area of law dealing with how
immigration law's various civil and criminal enforcement arms
employ truncated procedures to accomplish enforcement goals,
accompanied by a glaring lack of attention to procedural due process
rights.
Article uses the phrases "stipulated order of removal" and "stipulated removal"
interchangeably to refer to the latter process only.
34. In certain states along the U.S./Mexico border, the aggressive criminal prosecution
of all migrants crossing the border, under a program known as "Operation Streamline,"
has led to a proliferation in the use of group guilty plea hearings in order to control federal
district court backlogs. Operation Streamline's effect on criminal proceedings shares
similar themes as the use of stipulated orders of removal in the immigration context, in the
sense that both are driven in part by a perceived shortage of detention space,
overwhelmed court calendars, and the government's enforcement priorities, and both
suffer from due process concerns. For a helpful description of Operation Streamline, see
generally Joanna Jacobbi Lydgate, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation
Streamline, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 481 (2010). Given the dearth of literature on stipulated
orders of removal, this Article does not set forth a full account of the parallel use of
abbreviated procedures in both immigration and criminal law, although this area is ripe for
further development. Ingrid V. Eagly has examined the practical effects of current
immigration enforcement on the criminal justice system and suggested that a "criminal
immigration enforcement" system that takes place in the criminal law setting but also
incorporates the relaxed rights and procedures of immigration law has emerged. See Ingrid
V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1281, 1349 (2010).
35. See generally Legomsky, supra note 25 (critiquing absence of decisional
independence amongst immigration judges); Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra
note 24 (identifying wide disparities amongst immigration judges adjudicating asylum
applications); see also Stephen Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59
DUKE L.J. 1635, 1638 (2010) (advocating creation of Article I immigration court to
enhance quality of "formal system for adjudicating removal cases").
36. See Eagly, supra note 34, at 1283, 1284 (asserting that "[tihe consequences of ...
sustained focus on criminal immigration enforcement ... have remained under-
examined," and that the "existing scholarship ... has not adequately explored how
immigration operates in the criminal sphere-namely, how the rights, procedures, and
systems traditionally associated with the criminal system have themselves been affected by
interaction with the civil system of immigration").
37. Jill Family has initiated a scholarly conversation on "diversions" from the
immigration court system and has persuasively argued that "[the problems facing the
adjudication system do not justify intensifying executive power over immigration law
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Despite the growth of stipulated removal during the late 2000s,
its use has, until 2010, remained largely hidden from public scrutiny
and almost entirely absent from scholarly discussions related to
immigration.3 8 Nonetheless, stipulated orders of removal are gaining
judicial and public attention. In September 2010, the Executive Office
for Immigration Review ("EOIR"), the federal agency comprised of
the immigration courts and judges, issued an internal policy
memorandum in which it encouraged the greater use of stipulated
removal orders." In the same month that the executive branch
endorsed the stipulated removal program, the judicial branch
questioned it. In United States v. Ramos,4 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the stipulated removal order
entered against Isaac Ramos violated procedural due process and
Agency regulations.4 1 A year later, the nation's first comprehensive
advocacy report detailing the government's implementation of
stipulated orders of removal confirmed many of the concerns that
immigration advocates had previously voiced over the program, such
as the risk that individuals were agreeing to stipulated removal
because they erroneously believed they had no other choice.42
through the use of diversions." Jill Family, A Broader View of the Immigration
Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 595, 598 (2009). Family identifies stipulated
orders of removal as an example of such diversions and evaluates them against
administrative law principles. See id. at 616-17.
38. See id.
39. Memorandum from Brian M. O'Leary, Chief Immigration Judge, to All
Immigration Judges, Court Administrators, Attorney Advisors, Judicial Law Clerks and
Immigration Court Staff (Sept. 15,2010), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/oppm10/10-
01.pdf. The memorandum was accompanied by stipulated removal forms and procedures,
which had been developed collaboratively between EOIR and ICE.
40. 623 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2010).
41. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2012) (requiring that "the Immigration Judge must
determine that the alien's waiver [of rights] is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent").
42. See generally JENNIFER LEE KOH, JAYASHRI SRIKANTIAH & KAREN TUMLIN,
DEPORTATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS (2011), available at
http://www.stanford.edulgroup/irclDeportationWithoutDue_Process_2011.pdf
(explaining program). Prior to the release of DEPORTATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS, a
number of advocates expressed concerns about the growing use of stipulated orders of
removal, but none set forth details about the government's operation of the program. See,
e.g., Crossing the Border: Immigrants in Detention and Victims of Trafficking Part I and II:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism of the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 110th Cong. 41 (2007) (prepared statement of Christina Fiflis,
Member, Commission on Immigration, American Bar Association) (testifying, with
respect to stipulated orders of removal, that "detainees who may in fact be eligible for
immigration relief ... perceive that they have no other choice but to sign the order");
Policy Brief- Data Suggests Language Barriers Lead Immigrants to Waive Right to Hearing
Before Deportation, NAT'L IMMIGRANT JUST. CENTER,
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/publications/policy-brief-stipulated-orders (last visited
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This Article critiques the government's treatment of stipulated
removal as a solution to current crises of immigration adjudication
and detention and argues that the entry of stipulated removal orders
on unrepresented immigrant detainees who never appear before an IJ
constitutes a violation of procedural due process. Part I provides
relevant background and context for stipulated removal by explaining
the rights and protections that potentially apply to non-citizens and
generally only become real in immigration court hearings before IJs,
and it describes the factors that have contributed to the crisis in
immigration adjudication. Part II highlights the legal framework
surrounding stipulated removal and discusses stipulated removal's
regulatory and statutory history. Part III provides a descriptive
account of stipulated removal's implementation, drawing largely from
internal government records and data. Part IV examines the due
process concerns that are implicated by stipulated removal's
implementation thus far, both through the lens of recent
developments in illegal re-entry criminal prosecutions as well as
through the standard procedural due process framework set forth by
the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.4 3 Part V sets forth policy
recommendations, with a focus on recommendations that may take
place through the executive branch, without Congressional action.
I. THE CONTEXT: REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IMMIGRATION
COURTS
This Part sets forth the context in which stipulated orders of
removal have arisen: modern immigration adjudication. It first
discusses how many non-citizens, particularly the majority who do not
have legal representation, often lack substantive rights but do possess
procedural rights under the federal immigration statutes, regulations,
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It also discusses
the role of the immigration courts in enforcing those procedural
rights. Moreover, although the immigration laws leave many non-
citizens without defenses to removal, those same laws are sufficiently
nuanced and complex that a substantial number of immigrants who
face charges of removal may, upon further examination, have claims
to release from detention, relief from removal, or to termination of
the proceedings. This Part then proceeds to discuss the institutional
Oct. 28, 2012) (describing case of Colombian immigrant who signed stipulated order of
removal but did not understand consequences, despite fact that she had valid claim for
political asylum).
43. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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challenges facing immigration adjudication, which are significant, if
not overwhelming. At first blush, stipulated orders of removal may
seem to offer a partial solution to the challenges plaguing the
immigration courts and detention system. However, as demonstrated
in later sections, stipulated removal in its current form is too flawed
to serve as a remotely viable answer to the immigration adjudication
crisis.
A. The Standard Process: Non-Citizens' Rights and the Role of the
Immigration Judge
A well-established maxim of immigration law dictates that,
because removal is a civil sanction and distinct from criminal
punishment, the constitutional rights typically associated with
criminal proceedings do not apply." The civil administrative context
in which removal proceedings take place confirm their technically
noncriminal nature. Immigration courts are part of the EOIR, a sub-
agency of the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, a sub-agency of the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS"), prosecutes removal cases.45 Appeals of
immigration court decisions go to the Board of Immigration Appeals
("BIA")," and they only reach the federal judiciary through petitions
for review to the federal courts of appeal,4 7 whose jurisdiction over
44. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). The courts' rigid
treatment of deportation as a noncriminal sanction has been widely criticized, but
nonetheless upheld since Fong Yue Ting. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social
Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1890,1894-95 (2000); Markowitz, supra note 32, at 1314-16, 1325; Peter L.
Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding
the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 295,
338, 346 (2008); Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least
Some of the Constitution's Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L.
REV. 305, 313 (2000).
45. Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002 through
the Homeland Security Act. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 101,
116 Stat. 2135,2142 (2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 111(a) (2006)). Many of the immigration
functions of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, including immigration
enforcement, were assumed by DHS following the Homeland Security Act. See id. § 441,
116 Stat. at 2192 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 251 (2006)) (listing the functions transferred from
the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization to the Under Secretary for Border
and Transportation Security); About ICE: Overview, ICE.GOV,
http://www.ice.gov/aboutloverview (last visited Oct. 1, 2012) (stating that ICE "promote[s]
homeland security and public safety through the ... enforcement of federal laws
governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration").
46. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2012).
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2006).
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immigration matters is generally limited to constitutional questions or
questions of law.48
Procedural protections in removal proceedings are limited in
comparison to criminal proceedings, but nonetheless remain relevant
and retain their constitutional gravitas through procedural due
process. In 1903, the Supreme Court held that procedural due process
applies to deportation hearings,4 9 a principle to which the Court has
consistently adhered.so The Court has stated, for instance, that "the
Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States,
including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary or permanent."" Indeed, procedural due process claims
have become a focal point of many challenges to deficiencies in the
removal process, operating as a substitute for constitutional claims
that the courts do not recognize, in large part because of the doctrine
that Congress has plenary, unreviewable power over the immigration
laws." For instance, the Fifth Amendment has operated as a stand-in
for other constitutional criminal protections," such as the right to
counsel (including effective assistance of counsel) under the Sixth
48. Questions of fact or discretionary decisions are not appealable to the federal
courts. See id. § 1252(a)(2) (2006) (denying discretionary relief and preserving judicial
review of constitutional claims or questions of law); Rebecca Sharpless, Fitting the
Formula for Judicial Review: The Law-Fact Distinction in Immigration Law, 5
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 57 (2010) (stating that appeals by non-citizens
facing deportation are restricted to questions of law).
49. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903).
50. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) ("It is well established that the
Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.");
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) ("[D]eportation ... visits a great hardship on
the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of
freedom.... Meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by %'hich [the alien] is
deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness.").
51. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,679 (2001).
52. Hiroshi Motomura has influentially explained how, in immigration law,
procedural due process claims operate as a surrogate for substantial constitutional claims
that are ordinarily foreclosed by the plenary power doctrine. See generally Hiroshi
Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for
Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1625 (1992); see also Stephen H.
Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22
HASTINGS CONST'L. L.Q. 925, 931 (1995) (describing "the applicability of procedural due
process in deportation cases" as "[olne clear exception to the principle of plenary
congressional power [that] emerged early on").
53. See Anne R. Traum, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law on Its Own Path, 33
CARDOZO L. REv. 491, 493 (2011) (arguing that courts should continue to rely on due
process to "ensure that immigration proceedings are fair, just and sufficiently transparent"
rather than seek to expand the application of the Sixth Amendment).
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Amendment,5 4 the right to protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures under the Fourth Amendment,ss and the constitutional
right to discovery. 6
Procedural due process has also animated a number of statutory
rights that apply to immigration proceedings. In its current form,
section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") sets
forth the requirements for immigration court proceedings, including
protections that apply to all non-citizens facing removal.5' For
instance, immigrants have a statutory right to counsel (at no
government expense), the right to examine the evidence presented by
the government, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to
present evidence." These rights only become a reality when the
immigrant appears for a court hearing. Similarly, the right to appeal
an IJ's decision is protected by statute, grounded in procedural due
process, and requires adjudication before an IJ in order to be
realized. 9
Despite the harshness and blunt force with which the
immigration laws generally operate, 0 removal proceedings can lead
54. See Matter of Lozada, 19 1. & N. Dec. 637, 638 (B.I.A. 1988) (allowing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in removal proceedings under Fifth Amendment). But see
Matter of Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 710 (A.G. 2009) (eliminating Lozada right to
effective assistance of counsel under Fifth Amendment in immigration proceedings),
vacated by Matter of Compean, 25 1. & N. Dec. 1, 2-3 (A.G. 2009) (restoring Matter of
Lozada while directing Department of Justice to institute rulemaking procedures to
evaluate Lozada framework).
55. Although the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not
apply in the immigration context, it and other courts have suggested that "egregious"
Fourth Amendment violations should lead to application of the exclusionary rule. See INS
v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984). The Fifth Amendment also provides an
avenue for the suppression of illegally obtained evidence in removal proceedings. See
Matter of Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340, 343 (B.I.A. 1980); see also Jennifer M. Chac6n, A
Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1624-25 (2010) (questioning institutional
competence of immigration courts to hear exclusionary rule claims).
56. See Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 374 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding failure of
government to provide copy of non-citizen's "A-file" violated Fifth Amendment due
process).
57. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006) (describing the requirements for
immigration removal proceedings).
58. Id. § 1229a(b)(4).
59. Id. § 1229a(c)(5).
60. Many have offered commentary on the draconian and confusing nature of the
immigration laws, particularly the way in which drastic changes to the laws in 1996 left
large swaths of individuals subject to removal without the option of discretionary relief.
See, e.g., BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY AND
IMMIGRATION POLICY 5-7, 63-64 (2006); Kanstroom, supra note 44, at 1891-92; Nancy
Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope
of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1956-57 (2000).
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to surprising outcomes even where immigrants are not eligible for
relief from removal. For instance, because ICE has the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that an immigrant is
deportable, 6 1 the non-citizen can contest the factual allegations and
legal grounds of removability charged by the Agency. 62 For lawful
permanent residents charged with removal based on a prior criminal
conviction, arguing that a conviction does not fall within the statutory
ground articulated by the federal immigration laws may operate as a
particularly critical defense strategy because the immigration statute
may leave the non-citizen with no other options.' As part of proving
removability, the government must prove that the individual is not a
citizen of the United States. In some cases, the individual might be or
have a claim to U.S. citizenship,' or be able to suppress evidence that
he or she is a foreign national,' thereby leaving the government
unable to prove alienage. If the charge of removability (including
alienage) cannot be sustained, then the IJ may terminate the
proceedings altogether. Similarly, a defective charging document
could also enable the non-citizen to avoid deportation."
Even if deemed removable, in some (but not all) cases, the non-
citizen may apply for relief from removal. A pro se immigrant may
not learn about the opportunity to apply for relief until she sees the
judge, as federal regulations impose an affirmative obligation on the
IJ to inform the immigrant of any apparent eligibility for relief from
removal.6 1 Indeed, an IJ's failure to inform the non-citizen of the right
61. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (describing the burden of proof for deportable aliens).
62. The charges are listed on a document known as the Notice to Appear. See id.
§ 1229(a).
63. Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical
Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
(forthcoming 2013) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (explaining the
emergence of the categorical approach as critical defense strategy in removal proceedings
involving prior convictions).
64. For a compelling discussion of how and why the government has detained and
deported substantial numbers of U.S. citizens, see Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government
Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L.
606, 629 (2011).
65. Suppression motions are typically based on the theory that immigration agents
violated the Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, or federal regulations when obtaining
evidence of alienage. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984). They are
relatively rare and difficult to prevail on, in part due to the Supreme Court's ruling that
the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule does not apply in immigration cases as a
general rule, although it may apply where the constitutional violations are egregious or
widespread. Id.
66. See 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(c) (2012).
67. Id. § 1240.11(a)(2).
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to apply for relief can rise to the level of a due process violation."
Although immigration laws enacted in 1996 drastically narrowed the
categories of individuals who are statutorily eligible for relief from
removal, EOIR's reported statistics nonetheless suggest that
meaningful numbers of individuals apply for relief, are granted relief,
or have removal proceedings against them terminated. In fiscal year
2011, over a quarter of all immigration court cases resulted in either
the positive grant of relief that allowed the non-citizen to remain in
the United States or in termination of the proceedings altogether.'9
Once proceedings commence, in order to avoid physical removal (for
instance, through the grant of relief or termination of the
proceedings), the non-citizen must generally have her case
adjudicated by the immigration court.'
Although many forms of relief from removal enable the non-
citizen to remain in the United States, voluntary departure-in which
either the IJ or ICE permits the non-citizen to leave the country in
exchange for not having a formal order of removal entered against
her-is also a common outcome that provides the non-citizen with
important benefits over a removal order." In fiscal year 2011,
nineteen percent of all immigration court proceedings resulted in the
68. See infra discussion accompanying notes 305-13.
69. EOIR, FY 2011 YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at D2 (showing 11.6% of all cases
resolved by termination, and 14.4% of all matters in a grant of relief not including
voluntary departure by an immigration judge, in fiscal year 2011). Termination might also
result if a non-citizen received discretionary relief in which Citizenship and Immigration
Services (CIS), an immigration agency distinct from the immigration courts, had
jurisdiction over the application. For instance, respondents in removal proceedings who
receive U nonimmigrant status, a form of immigration relief for certain crime victims, may
in turn seek to have removal proceedings terminated once CIS grants status. See New
Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for "U" Nonimmigrant Status, 72
Fed. Reg. 53,014, 53,022 (Sept. 17, 2007) (contemplating termination of proceedings, with
consent of ICE, following grant of U visa by CIS). Note also that while 14.4% of all cases
resulted in the positive grant of relief, 24% percent of all matters before the immigration
courts involved an application for relief, meaning that in nearly a quarter of all cases the
non-citizen attempted to obtain relief. EOIR, FY 2011 YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at N.
70. See IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 329 (12th
ed. 2010). After the commencement of immigration proceedings, only the IJ may
terminate proceedings. Id.
71. Either an IJ or ICE must agree to a grant of voluntary departure, which is treated
as a form of immigration relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2006) (describing requirements for
voluntary departure). Voluntary departure is therefore distinct from the concept of "self-
deportation," which refers to efforts to make living conditions difficult enough for non-
citizens that they choose to return to their countries of origin without necessarily
communicating that choice to government officials. See Antonio Alarc6n, Do-It-Yourself
Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,2012, at A27 (describing then-presidential candidate Mitt
Romney's description of self-deportation as creating policies so that immigrants "decide
they can do better by going home because they can't find work here").
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grant of voluntary departure. 2 Like stipulated removal, voluntary
departure allows the government to obtain a speedier departure while
avoiding the costs of the removal process (such as detention or
obtaining travel documents). However, in sharp contrast to stipulated
removal, a grant of voluntary departure avoids the legal consequences
of a formal removal order such as bars to lawful re-admission in the
future and the possibility of criminal prosecution for illegal re-entry.
Like many other forms of relief, non-citizens faced with the prospect
of deportation may not know, prior to seeing an IJ, whether they can
seek voluntary departure or be familiar with its benefits.
Immigration detention during the pendency of one's removal
proceedings, and even throughout the appeals process, is a harsh
reality. In some cases, the option of release on bond may exist only if
the non-citizen appears before an IJ.73 Mandatory detention statutes
require ICE to categorically detain many non-citizens with prior
criminal convictions if those convictions fall within statutorily-
enumerated categories.74 When mandatory detention applies, the IJ
generally lacks the discretion to order the release of the individual on
bond unless the non-citizen can demonstrate that he or she does not
fall within the mandatory detention statute.75 Another statutory
provision authorizes ICE to detain almost any non-citizen charged
with any ground of removal, regardless of criminal history.
However, immigrants detained under non-mandatory detention
provisions remain eligible to request bond hearings before an U, in
which successfully showing that one is neither a flight risk nor a
danger to the community may lead to release on bond (or on lower
bond). Bond redetermination hearings-in which an IJ considers an
individual's request for release on bond or lower bond-account for a
72. EOIR, FY2011 YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at 01.
73. If ICE takes the position that a non-citizen falls within the criminal-based
mandatory detention statute at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1), then the non-citizen might be able to
seek release on bond through a "Joseph" hearing. See Matter of Joseph, 22 1. & N. Dec.
799 (B.I.A. 1999).
74. See § 1226(c)(1); see also Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory
Immigration Detention, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 601, 609-13 (2010) (discussing the
legal framework governing mandatory detention in the immigration context).
75. Joseph, 22 1. & N. Dec. 799, 800; see also Faiza W. Sayed, Challenging Detention:
Why Immigrant Detainees Receive Less Process than "Enemy Combatants" and Why They
Deserve More, 111 COLUM. L. REv. 1833, 1850-51 (2011) (describing, and identifying
procedural shortcomings in, "Joseph" hearings).
76. See § 1226(a).
77. Id.
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substantial portion of the immigration courts' dockets, with judges
receiving almost 77,000 bond matters in fiscal year 2011."
Immigration court hearings thus offer minimal, but significant,
protections to non-citizens facing deportation. But as the next Section
illustrates, the current system of immigration adjudication also faces
immense obstacles to processing the growing number of cases before
it.
B. Modern Pressures Facing Immigration Courts
Many commentators acknowledge that the immigration court
system is in a state of crisis and in dire need of reform." A number of
forces appear to have influenced the government's decision to rely on
stipulated orders of removal to alleviate the pressures burdening the
immigration courts." This Section briefly sets forth these
interconnected pressures, which include rapidly intensified
immigration enforcement, resource constraints in the immigration
courts, the perceived need for greater detention bed space, the fiscal
costs of immigration enforcement, and the lack of access to counsel
for non-citizen respondents.
Immigration enforcement reached an all-time high in 2011. In
fiscal year 2011, the federal government ordered 396,906 individuals
removed,8' nearly double the number from 2001.82 During the 2000s,
the Bush Administration escalated immigration enforcement in the
interior parts of the country. This expansion occurred through the use
of workplace raids and greater collaboration with local law
enforcement to carry out immigration objectives through the limited,
78. EOIR, FY 2011 YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at B7.
79. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS,
EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 2-4
(2010); APPLESEED & CHICAGO APPLESEED, supra note 27, at 1.
80. For instance, the former Commissioner of ICE in 2006 testified to Congress that
the Agency would explore practices like stipulated removal in order to "short-circuit the
removal process." Fiscal Year 2007 Appropriations for the Secure Border Initiative,
Immigration Customs and Enforcement, and Customs Border Protection: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. (2006)
(statement of Julie Myers, Comm'r, Immigration and Customs Enforcement) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
81. Press Release, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FY 2011: ICE Announces
Year-End Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities Including Threats to
Public Safety and National Security (Oct. 19, 2011),
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1110/111018washingtondc.htm.
82. DHS, 2010 YEARBOOK, supra note 29, at 94.
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but controversial, use of 287(g) agreements. 3 Under the Obama
Administration, immigration enforcement has continued, and
arguably intensified, to include the national deployment of local-
federal law enforcement collaborations, through programs such as
Secure Communities, and overall removal numbers that surpassed
those of the Bush Administration.' Indeed, political pressure to
report higher deportation numbers appears to have guided the
Obama Administration's immigration enforcement strategies, with
internal Agency communications released in February 2010 showing
that DHS had explicit quotas to achieve 400,000 deportations within
the fiscal year.8
Stronger immigration enforcement and the drive to obtain higher
removal numbers have placed pressure on the already-strained
governmental institutions that carry out these objectives. The
immigration courts are notoriously under-resourced and have not
kept up with the rapidly expanding pace of immigration enforcement.
The task of IJs has been compared to adjudicating death penalty
cases in traffic court." On average, four to six IJs share one judicial
law clerk. The immigration courts regularly experience severe
backlogs; in September 2011, nearly 300,000 cases were awaiting
resolution before the immigration courts." Despite rising caseloads,
IJs must adjudicate high-stakes cases against demanding case
83. These 287(g) agreements enabled state and local law enforcement, pursuant to
memoranda of understandings negotiated with the federal government, to be deputized
with immigration enforcement powers. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006); see also Chac6n,
supra note 55, at 1582-86 (describing a range of local-state-federal law enforcement
partnerships aimed at immigration enforcement); Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment
and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1137, 1149-68 (2008) (describing expanded interior enforcement efforts in immigration).
84. See AARTI KOHLI, PETER L. MARKOWITZ & LISA CHAVEZ, SECURE
COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE
PROCESS 1 (2011), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edulfiles
/SecureCommunitiesby-theNumbers.pdf.
85. E-mail from James M. Chaparro, Dir., DRO Taskings, to Field Office Dirs. and
Deputy Field Office Dirs. (Feb. 22, 2010) (stating that the Agency's projections "only
give[] us a total of just over 310,000 overall removals-well under the Agency's goal of
400,000"), http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents
/ICEdocumentO32710.pdf? sid=ST2010032700037.
86. See Memorandum from Dana Leigh Marks, President, Nat'l Ass'n of Immigration
Judges, Immigration Court Needs: Priority Short List of the NAIJ 2 (Oct. 2009),
http://law.psu.edu/file/NAIJ%20Priorities%20Short%2OList%20-%200ctober%202009.
pdf.
87. Immigration Court Backlog Rises for Another Year, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Dec. 8, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/whatsnew/email.111208.html
(reporting all-time high backlog of 297,551 cases pending in September 2011).
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completion calendars that place pressure on judges to finish cases as
quickly as possible. 8
The problem of backlogs in immigration court, coupled with the
current system of immigration detention, means that non-citizens can
regularly face prolonged periods of time in jail-like conditions while
they wait to see an IJ who can adjudicate their case. Immigration
detention has become a multi-million, if not multi-billion, dollar
industry for the private corporations who administer the majority of
the nation's immigration detention facilities. 9 The average length in
detention for immigrants who appear for IJ hearings is forty-one
days,90 but detention can last for months and even years, depending
on the case. 1
Immigration enforcement and detention are not cheap, and costs
for both have grown astronomically since the passage of the 1996
laws. In fiscal year 2012, ICE's enacted budget was $5.862 billion,92
while Customs and Border Protection ("CBP"), which regulates the
borders, had an enacted budget of $11.737 billion.93 Together, the two
agencies' budgets represented over $17.5 billion, more than thirty
percent of DHS's total $59.7 billion budget.9 4 Notably, an increase of
$157.7 million was intended for ICE's Custody Operations to
"support 33,400 detention beds" and the removal of "criminal
aliens.""s As a point of comparison, in 1998, the then-Immigration
88. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW: CASELOAD PERFORMANCE REPORTING NEEDS
IMPROVEMENT, at executive summary (2006), http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/251155.pdf
(stating that "EOIR evaluates the performance of the immigration courts based on the
immigration courts' success in meeting case completion goals").
89. See Detention Watch Network, The Influence of the Private Prison Industry on
Immigration Detention (2008), http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons
(discussing the difficulty of identifying precise percentage of profits resulting from ICE
contracts generated for three corporations that collectively administer over 25,000
detention beds on behalf of ICE).
90. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT SALARIES AND EXPENSES, FISCAL YEAR 2011 OVERVIEW
CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 49 (2011), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure-communities/fy20lloverviewcongressional
justification.pdf.
91. See Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 42,49 (2010) (discussing prolonged immigration detention).
92. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 25
(2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-budget-in-brief-fy2013.pdf.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 3, 23.
95. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET IN BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 10
(2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assetsfbudget-bib-fy2012.pdf.
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and Naturalization Service's budget was approximately $3.6 billion,96
and in 1996 the federal government had 8,000 immigration detention
beds.'
The lack of access to legal counsel for immigrants in removal
proceedings, and particularly for those in detention, exacerbates the
adjudication challenges noted above. Non-citizens in removal
proceedings have no right to government-appointed counsel, and the
majority of detained immigrants are pro se.9" Not surprisingly, eighty-
four percent of detained non-citizens are not represented.9 Many
immigration detention facilities exist in remote locations that make it
nearly impossible for detained immigrants to obtain or even consult
with counsel.'" According to one study, eighty percent of all
immigrant detainees are "severely" underserved by nonprofit legal
organizations.'01 The Legal Orientation Program ("LOP"), an EOIR-
funded initiative in which nonprofit attorneys host legal rights
presentations, does not reach half the detained population.102 Despite
the severe absence of legal representation for detained immigrants,
having a lawyer may be one of the most critical factors for prevailing
in one's case. Indeed, studies have shown a strong correlation
between having an attorney and success in the removal
proceedings, 0 suggesting that a more robust right to counsel could
96. See Chac6n, supra note 55, at 1571.
97. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2002 BUDGET SUMMARY 114 (2001),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/jmd/2002summary/pdf/ins breached bond.pdf.
98. See Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants
Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
541, 541-42 (2009) (indicating that fifty-eight percent of detained immigrants in removal
proceedings did not have lawyers).
99. AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION
SYSTEM, PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY AND
PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 5-8 (2010),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dan/aba/migrated/lmmigration/PublicDocuments/ab
a complete-full-report.authcheckdam.pdf.
100. See NAT'L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., ISOLATED IN DETENTION: LIMITED
ACCESS TO LEGAL COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES JEOPARDIZES A
FAIR DAY IN COURT 3 (2010), www.immigrantjustice.org/policy-
resources/isolatedindetention/intro.htmi.
101, Id. (defining "severely underserved" facilities as holding "more than 100 detainees
for every full-time [non-governmental organization] attorney providing legal services").
102. Id. at 7 ("In 2009, just 51 percent of the detention population ... had access to
LOPs.
103. One study found that for non-detained immigrants, seventy-four percent who are
represented have a successful outcome, in comparison to thirteen percent who are not
represented. Of detained immigrants, thirteen percent have a successful outcome, in
comparison to three percent who are not represented. See Steering Comm. of the N.Y.
Immigrant Representation Study Report, Accessing Justice: The Availability and
Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33 CARDOzO L. REV. 357, 363-44 (2011)
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increase the number of individuals who receive positive outcomes in
their removal proceedings as well as move cases more efficiently
through the system.
Furthermore, immigration courts lack a series of rules and norms
designed to facilitate a regular practice of engaging in stipulations or
settlements that, in other forums, might address judicial economy
concerns. "0 Removal proceedings are a form of administrative
litigation. In many other civil and criminal litigation systems, where
the vast majority of cases do not go to trial, the parties are
encouraged to agree upon issues that are not in dispute through a
process that includes pretrial conference, requiring the parties to
meet and confer, required disclosures, and other practices that have
developed over time.10 By contrast, the immigration courts do not
foster a litigation culture in which the parties engage in arms-length
negotiations that result in the entry into stipulations on a regular
basis. Litigation practices that, in other courts, encourage pretrial
stipulations do not frequently take place, such as prehearing
conferences or exercising a duty of disclosure.106
Given that immigration court backlogs are preventing DHS from
meeting its enforcement goals, it is not surprising that the federal
government has looked to solutions that enable it to bypass the
immigration courts. Nor should it be surprising, given the conditions
described above, that many non-citizens decide not to fight their cases
and instead choose to return home rather than face prolonged
detention. In light of these pressures, one might think that stipulated
orders of removal offer a suitable solution. However, as
demonstrated below, the constitutional harms created by stipulated
removal's implementation to date far outweigh its benefits.
(finding that "[t]he two most important variables affecting the ability to secure a successful
outcome in a case (defined as relief or termination) are having representation and being
free from detention" (footnote omitted)).
104. Thanks to Lenni Benson for bringing this point to my attention. For a more
extensive discussion of the use of prehearing conferences and other case management
tools in immigration court, see BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 18, at 67-74.
105. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (describing pretrial conferences); FED. R. Civ. P. 26
(describing required disclosures); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (describing required disclosures).
106. In the Ninth Circuit, ICE attorneys must provide a copy of the non-citizen's "A-
File," or "Alien File," when requested, but this requirement only became mandatory in
2010 as a result of litigation. See Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 374-75 (9th Cir. 2010).
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II. A PARTIAL SOLUTION? UNDERSTANDING STIPULATED
ORDERS OF REMOVAL
What are the precise legal effects of a stipulated removal order?
Where does the legal authority for stipulated removal orders come
from? This Part discusses the regulatory and statutory framework
governing stipulated orders of removal, including their history and
effect.
A. Statutory and Regulatory Authority: Waiving Rights in Removal
Proceedings
The stipulated removal statute appears within section 240 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, which addresses immigration court
removal proceedings generally." The statute does nothing more than
instruct the Attorney General to "provide by regulation for the entry
by an immigration judge an order of removal stipulated to by the
alien (or the alien's representative) and [ICE]," and states that a
"stipulated order shall constitute a conclusive determination of the
alien's removability from the United States."' The statute therefore
delegates the bulk of the procedure to the administrative agency to
develop consistent with the statute and Constitution.
As described in greater detail by the federal regulation, the entry
of a stipulated removal order both explicitly and implicitly eliminates
the procedures and protections associated with immigration court
hearings. A brief regulation consisting of less than 300 words sets
forth the Agency's vision of stipulated orders of removal and their
legal effect. The regulation, at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b), states as follows:
An Immigration Judge may enter an order of deportation,
exclusion or removal stipulated to by the alien (or the alien's
representative) and [ICE]. The Immigration Judge may enter
such an order without a hearing and in the absence of the
parties based on a review of the charging document, the written
stipulation, and supporting documents, if any. If the alien is
unrepresented, the Immigration Judge must determine that the
alien's waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The
107. Although beyond the scope of the Article, other provisions within section 240 of
the INA lend weight to a colorable argument that the stipulated removal regulations are
ultra vires of the immigration statute because they authorize the entry of removal orders
on unrepresented immigrants without an immigration court hearing. See 8 U.S.C.
1229a(a)(3) (2006) (stating that a "proceeding under this section shall be the sole and
exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted ... for] removed
from the United States" (emphasis added)).
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d) (2006).
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stipulated request and required waivers shall be signed on
behalf of the government and by the alien and his or her
attorney or representative, if any.... A stipulated order shall
constitute a conclusive determination of the alien's
deportability or removability from the United States.'09
The regulation enumerates items that the written stipulation
"shall" include, which highlight the main legal consequences of a
stipulated removal order."o The non-citizen waives the right to any
in-person hearing before an IJ, including the initial master calendar
hearing or bond-related hearings."' The regulation sends mixed
signals as to whether an IJ should, nonetheless, insist that an in-
person hearing take place. On one hand, the written request signed
by the non-citizen must state that the waiver of rights is "voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent,"1 2 and the judge "may enter" the removal
order "without a hearing," suggesting that no hearing is necessary."'
On the other hand, by stating that the IJ "must determine that the
[unrepresented] alien's waiver is voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent,""' the regulation contemplates that, for pro se
immigrants, an IJ should conduct an independent inquiry that goes
beyond relying on the written document.
The request for a stipulated removal order admits the factual
allegations raised by DHS," concedes the legal grounds of
removability,"6 and waives any rights to discretionary relief from
deportation."' ICE is therefore relieved of the burden of proving
removability. Thus, even if the immigrant could contest removability,
seek discretionary relief, or otherwise lawfully remain in the country,
the act of signing a stipulated removal order waives the right to
pursue each of these avenues. Although not stated explicitly in the
regulation, a stipulated order also prevents the non-citizen from
109. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2012).
110. See generally id. (detailing consequences).
111. Id.
112. Id. § 1003.25(b)(6) (requiring "[a] statement that the alien understands the
consequences of the stipulated request and that the alien enters the request voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently").
113. Id. § 1003.25(b).
114. Id.
115. Id. § 1003.25(b)(1) (requiring "[aln admission that all factual allegations contained
in the charging document are true and correct as written").
116. Id. § 1003.25(b)(2) (requiring "[a] concession of deportability or inadmissibility as
charged").
117. Id. § 1003.25(b)(3) (requiring "[a] statement that the alien makes no application
for relief under the Act").
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seeking release from detention on bond, even if he is eligible for a
bond hearing, because a bond hearing must take place before an IJ.
An IJ reviews the written record, including the non-citizen's
stipulated request, and issues the removal order itself."' As a result, a
stipulated removal order carries the legal consequences of a fully-
litigated removal order. For instance, the immigration laws bar an
individual who receives a formal order of removal from subsequently
returning, even if a valid visa is available, for anywhere from five to
twenty years."' The non-citizen also becomes vulnerable to criminal
prosecution under federal illegal re-entry statutes. While all non-
citizens who cross the border without permission from DHS may face
criminal prosecution for misdemeanor illegal entry,120 the sentence for
illegal re-entry-which requires the existence of a prior removal
order-can be astronomically more severe, with potential sentences
reaching as high as twenty years, depending on the circumstances
surrounding the prior removal order.121
Finally, a stipulated removal order waives the non-citizen's rights
to appeal the removal order to the BIA. 122 Since the immigrant must
exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing a petition for review in
the courts of appeal,123 the stipulated order also arguably eliminates
the right to judicial review.'24
B. Regulatory and Statutory History: Allowing Stipulated Removal
for Pro Se Non-Citizens
The practice of allowing non-citizens to agree to their own
removal orders appears to have begun in the early 1990s. In the
beginning, no regulation or statute addressed the practice, and such
removal orders generally took place only with non-citizens who had
lawyers able to convey their client's desire for a faster removal in lieu
118. Id. § 1003.25(b)(7) (requiring "[a] statement that the alien will accept a written
order for his or her deportation, exclusion or removal as a final disposition of the
proceedings").
119. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A) (2006).
120. Id. § 1325.
121. See id. § 1326(b)(2). For a discussion of the sentencing enhancement scheme that
attaches to illegal re-entry cases, see generally, Doug Keller, Why the Prior Conviction
Sentencing Enhancements in Illegal Re-Entry Cases Are Unjust and Unjustified (and
Unreasonable Too), 51 B.C. L. REV. 719 (2010).
122. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b)(8) (2012) (requiring "[a] waiver of appeal of the written
order of deportation or removal").
123. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2006).
124. The stipulated removal regulation contains no provision waiving the immigrant's
right to file a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider before the IJ or BIA. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2012).
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of an in-person hearing.125 As explained below, in 1996, Congress
enacted extensive changes to the immigration laws and to removal
procedures in particular.'2 In the midst of the 1996 immigration
legislation, Congress and the executive branch quickly and quietly-
but radically-transformed stipulated orders of removal. Prior to the
enactment of the statute and regulation, stipulated removal was
available for the small percentage of represented non-citizens who,
with the benefit of counsel, could determine that they were ineligible
for immigration relief and thus could benefit from a more efficient
removal.2  By the time DHS issued the rule that has governed
stipulated removal since passage of the 1996 immigration laws,
stipulated removal had become a program that ICE could employ on
vast numbers of non-citizens facing removal without access to counsel
or even to accurate legal information.'
Prior to the enactment of the stipulated removal statute in 1996,
the Agency proposed two versions of a regulation governing
stipulated removal. Despite the allure of greater efficiency offered by
stipulated removal, including problems of overcrowding in
immigration detention facilities and backlogs in the immigration
courts, 129 both versions explicitly limited its use to non-citizens with
counsel.'30 Even when stipulated orders of removal were
contemplated for represented non-citizens only, due process concerns
influenced the Agency's internal deliberations. According to the
Agency, "numerous commentators['] . . . due process concerns"
directly influenced the Agency's decision to limit stipulated orders to
125. See Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Stipulated Requests for Deportation or
Exclusion Orders Telephonic, Video Teleconferenced Hearings, 59 Fed. Reg. 24,976,
24,976 (proposed May 13, 1994) (proposing regulations that would "codif[y] the litigation
practice in some jurisdictions").
126. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 125.
128. See supra Part I.B.
129. See Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Stipulated Requests for Deportation or
Exclusion Orders, Telephonic, Video Electronic Media Hearings, 60 Fed. Reg. 26,351,
26,352 (May 17, 1995) (suggesting that wider use of stipulated removal "could alleviate
overcrowded federal, state and local detention facilities and eliminate the need to calendar
such uncontested cases on crowded Immigration Court dockets").
130. Stipulated Requests for Deportation or Exclusion Orders Telephonic, Video
Teleconferenced Hearings, 59 Fed. Reg. at 24,976. The 1994 version of the regulation
would have made the approval of a stipulated removal order mandatory for the IJ. See id.
(noting that "this practice currently occurs at the discretion of the Immigration Judge,
[but] the proposed rule would make it mandatory"). In 1995, EOIR issued a rule that, in
response to comments on the 1994 rule, retained the requirement that non-citizens have
counsel. Stipulated Requests for Deportation or Exclusion Orders, Telephonic, Video
Electronic Media Hearings, 60 Fed. Reg. at 26,351.
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represented immigrants and to give Us discretion over whether to
sign the orders, as opposed to making IJ approval of the orders
mandatory.' To further safeguard the requirement that non-citizens
understand the effect of the waivers, the Agency also specified that
the IJ must determine that any waiver was effected "voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently.""
In the mid-1990s, massive public concern over illegal
immigration and foreign terrorism led to sweeping changes in the
immigration laws.133 The 1996 laws contained provisions aimed at
"streamlin[ing] rules and procedures in the [INA] to make it easier to
deny admission to inadmissible aliens and easier to remove
deportable aliens from the United States," 3 4 among other significant
(and much-critiqued) changes to the statute."' For instance, the 1996
laws enacted "expedited removal" provisions that authorized border
officials to summarily return individuals apprehended at the border
without a hearing, unless they claimed asylum and could convince a
border official that they had a "credible fear" of returning to their
home country,1 6 a practice that gave rise to sustained human rights-
based criticisms.' 7 Another change affected non-citizens who re-
entered the United States after having been previously removed. The
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
131. Stipulated Requests for Deportation or Exclusion Orders, Telephonic, Video
Electronic Media Hearings, 60 Fed. Reg. at 26,351 (also stating that the final version of the
rule was "modified to respond to the commentators' due process concern," and noting
specifically that IJ discretion "is limited to cases in which the applicant or respondent is
represented at the time of the stipulation").
132. Id. at 26,351-52.
133. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C).
134. H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt.1, at 157 (1996).
135. In addition to reconfiguring the procedures employed to deport non-citizens from
the United States, IIRIRA and AEDPA also expanded the Agency's detention authority,
expanded the grounds for removal, contracted avenues for discretionary relief, and
eliminated several avenues for the federal courts to exercise judicial review over agency
decisions. See Kanstroom, supra note 44, at 1981; Morawetz, supra note 60, at 1936-54.
136. Lisa J. Laplante, Expedited Removal at U.S. Borders: A World Without a
Constitution, 25 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 213,221-24 (1999) (describing expedited
removal); Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to Be Broken: How the
Process of Expedited Removal Fails Asylum Seekers, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 167, 175-93
(2006) (describing failure of agency officials to follow mandatory procedural safeguards
associated with expedited removal); Jaya Ramji, Legislating Away International Law: The
Refugee Provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37
STAN. J. INT'L L. 117, 134-41 (2001) (arguing that expedited removal provisions violate
international human rights laws).
137. See Ramji, supra note 136, at 134-41.
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1996 ("IIRIRA") enacted reinstatement of removal provisions that
required the immediate removal of such individuals, again without a
hearing or any opportunity to seek relief.3 8
By contrast to the public criticism over expedited removal and
other proposed changes aimed at streamlining the deportation
process,13 9 the stipulated removal provision received far less, and
indeed almost no, attention. The 1996 laws added the statutory
provision authorizing stipulated removal.'o However brief, the new
statutory language authorizing stipulated removal radically changed
the nature of the practice. By stating that the alien "or the alien's
representative" could stipulate to a removal order, the statute opened
the door to the possibility of unrepresented non-citizens receiving
such orders.141 The stipulated removal statute passed with no explicit
legislative debate.
In January 1997, EOIR and the then-Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") proposed a new version of the
stipulated removal regulation that completely eliminated the
requirement that stipulated orders be limited to represented non-
citizens.142 The seventy-three-page Federal Register announcement
also sought to implement "pervasive" changes to many aspects of the
1996 immigration laws enacted by Congress, including the procedures
governing expedited removal, removal procedures, asylum claims,
apprehension, and detention, which the Federal Register described as
"[broad] and complex[]."' 43 Despite the length of the overall
proposed regulation, stipulated orders of removal received no
explanatory discussion. The Federal Register simply contained the
revised regulation, which seemed to bury the authorization for
stipulated removal that is used on pro se immigrants.1"
138. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 305,
110 Stat. at 3009-599 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2006)); 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.8(a) (2012).
139. See sources cited supra note 136.
140. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
§ 304(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 3009-593 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d) (2006)).
141. Id.
142. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens;
Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 444 (proposed Jan. 3,
1997).
143. Id at 444 (noting that the "length of this rulemaking document alone ...
demonstrates the breadth and complexity of these changes").
144. Id. at 459.
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Just two months after the issuance of the post-IIRIRA stipulated
removal regulations,4 1 the Agency's interim regulations-which
remain in force today-retained the provision permitting the entry of
stipulated orders on unrepresented non-citizens. The regulations
acknowledged the due process concerns raised during the notice-and-
comment period, 4 6 but they did not change the regulation." Instead,
the agency pointed to the "requirement that the [IJ] determine if an
unrepresented alien's waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent,"
explaining that the requirement would "safeguard[] against an
imprudent waiver of a formal adjudication on the part of an
unrepresented alien."" The Agency went on to acknowledge the
possibility of an IJ holding a hearing on a stipulated removal request,
stating that "[i]f an [IJ] is confronted with a stipulated request raising
due process concerns, he or she may examine that request in the
context of a hearing." 4 9 However, as detailed in the next Section,
ICE approached stipulated removal with the expectation that Us
should disregard the possibility of holding an in-person hearing as a
safeguard on due process concerns.
III. STIPULATED REMOVAL IN PRACTICE
This Part provides the first descriptive account in legal
scholarship of how the stipulated removal program has operated in
recent years, with an emphasis on the period from 1996 to 2010, and
draws largely from internal Agency records and data made available
through Freedom of Information Act'5 0 requests and litigation."s
Despite its existence in the statute and regulations for the past fifteen
years, very little has been known about stipulated orders of
removal.152 Several factors have contributed to stipulated removal's
145. The agencies had been directed by Congress to publish implementing regulations
by March 1, 1997, just five months after the enactment of IIRIRA and AEDPA on
September 30, 1996. Id. As a result, the public was given only thirty days for comments,
rather than the usual sixty days. Id.
146. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens;
Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,322 (Mar.
6, 1997) (describing concern of commentator that proposed regulation failed to provide




150. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
151. See Nat'l Lawyers Guild S.F. Chapter v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. C 08-5137
RS (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 12, 2008).
152. Press Release, Jayashri Srikantiah and Karen Tumlin, Nat'l Immigration Law Ctr.,
Backgrounder: Stipulated Removal 1 (Nov. 12, 2008),
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almost secretive status. First, the vast majority of stipulated removal
orders take place in immigration detention facilities, which have been
criticized for imposing systematic barriers on detainees'
communication with the outside world through a regime that involves
remote locations, frequent transfers of detainees, and hurdles to
obtaining legal information and representation."1' Second, even
though complaints about the lack of transparency in immigration law
are not new,15 4 the Agency has released surprisingly little information
about stipulated removal to the public.15 Third, a combination of law
and practice has made it difficult for those who have signed stipulated
orders to later challenge them. Because stipulated removal
disproportionately affects pro se immigrants who are often deported
within days, immigration attorneys have limited exposure to
individuals who agree to stipulated orders. The speed of the process
means that individuals who might have claims to challenge stipulated
orders have little time to hire an attorney to challenge the order.
Once deported, the Agency's rule that immigrants could not file a
motion to reopen a removal order once physically removed-known
as the post-departure bar (which several courts of appeal have
invalidated)-likely prevented recipients of stipulated removal orders
who were outside of the United States from filing legal claims.'16 As a
result, the federal courts and BIA have had limited opportunities to
fully examine the implications of the Agency's use of stipulated
orders of removal, while stipulated removal has remained far from
the public eye.
http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/child-page/163220/doc/sispublic/
Stipulated-removal backgrounder.pdf ("Despite the rapid expansion of stipulated
removal, little is known about when and how these orders are used by immigration
officials.").
153. See Kalhan, supra note 91; NAT'L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., supra note 100, at 3.
154. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and
Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
155. For instance, neither the DHS Statistical Yearbook nor the EOIR Statistical
Yearbook contains any reporting on stipulated orders of removal. See DHS, FY 2010
YEARBOOK, supra note 29; EOIR, FY 2011 YEARBOOK, supra note 23.
156. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2012). A number of circuit courts of appeal have invalidated
the post-departure bar as an invalid exercise of Agency discretion. See Contreras-
Bocanegra v. Holder, 678 F.3d 811, 813 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Prestol Espinal v. Att'y
Gen. of U.S, 653 F.3d 213, 224 (3d Cir. 2011); Reyes-Torres v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1073, 1076
(9th Cir. 2011); Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 904 (9th Cir. 2010); William v. Gonzales, 499
F.3d 329, 330 (4th Cir. 2007), appeal denied, 359 F App'x. 370 (4th Cir. 2009); see also
Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported: Territoriality, Finality, and
the Significance of Departure, 33 U. HAw. L. REV. 139, 140-43 (2010) (explaining post-
departure bar).
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Since approximately 2010, immigration advocates, the federal
courts, and the immigration agencies have begun to shed light on how
the executive branch has implemented stipulated orders of removal."'
The program's relatively brief history, and the little existing
information about it, suggests that stipulated removal has rapidly
expanded throughout immigration detention centers for use primarily
on unrepresented detainees. As the next Part discusses, most IJs
signed stipulated removal orders without holding in-person hearings
to independently verify that the immigrant understood the
consequences of signing the order. Given the lack of access to counsel
and the absence of procedural protections for detainees during the
process, the program as implemented has a high potential for abuse
and for implicating the procedural due process principles that apply
to removal proceedings.
A. Expansion at National and Local Levels
A dramatic growth in the entry of stipulated orders took place in
the mid-to-late 2000s. According to data from the EOIR, at least
160,000 stipulated removal orders were entered through May 2010,
with a steady increase in numbers from 2004 to 2009 in particular. 5 1
The then-INS first aggressively encouraged the expansion of the
stipulated removal program in the late 1990s, shortly after the
regulatory revision that enabled their use on pro se immigrants. 59
One Regional Director of the Agency "mandat[ed]" the use of
stipulated removal-along with administrative removal and
reinstatement of removal-"as early as possible in the investigative or
157. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
158. DEPORTATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS contained data on the number of
stipulated removal orders entered through May 2010. See KOH, SRIKANTIAH & TUMLIN,
supra note 42, at iii, 3. Since then, a report issued by the Administrative Conference of the
United States reported on total numbers of stipulated removal orders entered in fiscal
years 2010 and 2011. BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 18, at 129.
159. See, e.g., Memorandum from Thomas C. Leupp, E. Reg'] Dir., EOIR, to E.
Region Dist. Dirs. & Chief Patrol Agents (July 24, 1997) (EOIR-2008-5140(7)-0000451)
(on file with author); Memorandum from Brian R. Perryman, Exec. Assoc. Comm'r,
Headquarters Office of Field Operations, ICE, to Regional and District Dirs., Chief Patrol
Agents, & Service Ctr. Dirs. (July 31, 1997) (ICE.08-1450(13).000258) (on file with
author); Memorandum from Dwayne E. Peterson, ICE Acting Regional Dir., to Central
Region Dist. Dirs. & Chief Patrol Agents (Aug. 28, 1997) (ICE.08-1450.00003) (on file
with author); Memorandum from Mark K. Reed, ICE regional director, to Central Region
District Dirs. & Chief Patrol Agents (June 4, 1998) (ICE.08-1450.000001) (on file with
author). Stanford Law School has archived the memoranda and e-mails obtained through
the FOIA lawsuit. See Deportation Without Due Process, STAN. L. CLINIC (Sept. 1, 2011),
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/stipulatedremoval/. All identifying numbers used herein refer
to documents listed on the website.
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arrest stages."'o The Regional Director noted it was "imperative that
all Districts and Sectors ensure the maximum possible use of these
procedures," all of which were designed to bypass immigration court
hearings. Another memorandum adopted a similar tenor, stating that
a "notice to appear before an Immigration Judge should only be
served after clearly determining that the alien is ineligible for
alternative removal proceedings," including stipulated removal. 161
However, from 1997 to 2004, stipulated removal was rarely used. The
factors preventing greater use of stipulated removal orders during the
late 1990s and early 2000s are unclear. It may be that the 1996 laws
introduced such massive changes to immigration law enforcement
that stipulated orders were overshadowed by other enforcement
priorities, especially the expansion of criminal grounds of removal,6 2
litigation over the retroactive application of the 1996 laws,163 and
elimination of the right to habeas corpus review and other restrictions
on judicial review of removal orders."
In 2004, ICE again shifted its attention to stipulated orders of
removal. Internal Agency memoranda directed officers to maximize
the use of stipulated removal in connection with efforts to enhance
efficiency in the removal process.165 For instance, one internal
160. Memorandum from Mark K. Reed, supra note 159; see also Memorandum from
Brian R. Perryman, supra note 159, at 258-59 (encouraging the use of alternatives to
immigration court proceedings, including stipulated removal).
161. Memorandum from Dwayne E. Peterson, supra note 159, at 3-4; see also
Memorandum from Thomas C. Leupp, supra note 159 ("strongly recommendling) ...
implementing an aggressive program" to use stipulated removals for all non-citizens for
whom reinstatement or administrative removal are inappropriate).
162. See Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship and Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and
the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 632-35 (2003) (discussing the expansion of
criminal grounds of removal through immigration laws passed in 1996).
163. See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due
Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 115-18 (1998) (explaining changes in 1996
immigration laws that gave rise to retroactive application of certain criminal grounds of
removal).
164. See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to
Judicial Review in Removal Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1465 78 (1997)
(discussing restrictions on judicial review enacted by 1996 immigration laws); Lenni B.
Benson, The New World ofJudicial Review of Removal Orders, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233,
233 (1998) (describing as "perhaps the most important change" in the 1996 immigration
laws the "attempt to eliminate or severely curtail judicial review of immigration
decisions"); Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the
1996 Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2509-16 (1998) (discussing jurisdictional
issues raised by the elimination of habeas relief and restrictions on judicial review created
by 1996 immigration laws).
165. See, e.g., Memorandum from Anthony S. Tangeman, Office of Detention and
Removal Dir., ICE, to Leonard Kovensky, Deputy Assistant Dir. of Field Operations Div.
& Field Office Dirs., ICE (Jan. 12, 2004) (ICE.08-1450(1).000006) (on file with author)
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memorandum circulated amongst top DHS officials noted that
"[e]ach component [of the Agency] must ensure apprehended aliens
are processed efficiently and placed in the appropriate and most
expedient removal process," including stipulated removal.'" In
recognition of the fact that the immigration courts and enforcement
agency are divided into a series of local courts and field offices, 67 the
Agency encouraged its regional and local offices to create protocols
for the implementation of stipulated removal. 6 s In 2007, the Director
of ICE's detention and removal office explicitly linked the use of
stipulated removal to the Agency's need to efficiently manage its
detention bed space and instructed all directors of local ICE field
offices to "expand the use of stipulated orders of removal."'"6 The
Agency's renewed focus on stipulated removal in the mid-2000s
appears to be connected to the Bush Administration's immigration
enforcement strategy, which involved increasing the overall number
of formal removals, greater use of immigration detention, and
stronger immigration enforcement in the interior parts of the
country. 7 0 For example, one internal memo to all field office
directors of ICE emphasized ICE's "goal ... to improve removal
operational efficiency by at least ten percent from the prior fiscal
year, which would result in approximately 207,000 removals during
(requiring all Field Office Directors to coordinate with the Office of Chief Counsel and
the local court to develop procedures for stipulated removal orders).
166. Memorandum from Asa Hutchinson, Under Sec'y for Border & Transp. Sec.,
DHS, to Robert C. Bonner, Comm'r, Customs and Border Protection and Michael J.
Garcia, Assistant Sec'y, ICE (Oct. 18, 2004) (ICE.08-1450(3)-000157) [hereinafter
Hutchinson Memo] (on file with author); see also Memorandum from Marey M. Forman,
Director of Office of Investigations, ICE and Victor X. Cerda, Acting Director of
Detention and Removal Operations, ICE to All Special Agents in Charge and All Field
Office Dirs., ICE (Jan. 11, 2005) (ICE.08-1450(3)-000155) (on file with author)
(referencing the Hutchinson Memo and reiterating the emphasis on the use of stipulated
and other alternative removal forms).
167. See Enforcement and Removal Operations, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/contact/ero
(last visited Sept. 22, 2012) (listing ICE field offices); EOIR Immigration Court Listing,
U.S. DEP'T OF JuST., http://www.justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm (last visited Sept. 22,
2012) (listing immigration courts).
168. See Memorandum from Anthony S. Tangeman, supra note 165.
169. Memorandum from John P. Torres, Dir., ICE, to Field Office Dirs., ICE (Aug. 1,
2007) (ICE-08-1450(4)-000031) (on file with author) (instructing that "each of you must
... leixpand the use of Stipulated Orders of Removal" and noting the "end [of] the
practice of 'catch and release' along the southern border" in 2005 and anticipated
increases to detention bed space in the upcoming fiscal year).
170. See Kalhan, supra note 83, at 1149-68; Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that
Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal
Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1832, 1850-52 (2011) (discussing the use of worksite raids
under the second term of the Bush Administration and the effect of 287(g) program on
subfederal law enforcement's role in immigration enforcement).
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the 2007 fiscal year.""' Immigration enforcement goals thus gave rise
to a heightened need to efficiently manage the removal process while
obtaining successively higher removal numbers each year.
Implementation of stipulated removal in the mid-2000s, when
stipulated removal expanded, took place primarily through local ICE
field offices and immigration courts developing their own protocols to
incentivize the entry of such orders.172 For at least some ICE field
offices, the ability to report higher numbers of official removal orders,
and the creation of stipulated removal quotas for individual offices,
appears to have motivated the use of stipulated removal. 17  For
instance, an ICE official in Atlanta, Georgia indicated in an internal
e-mail that stipulated removal orders should be used even if voluntary
departure is available because the latter "do[es] not count for
statistics and[,] let's face it[,] I would prefer a bigger BANG for our
tax dollars that we will invest during this operation."1 74 Other
incentives, such as monthly quotas 75 or better evaluations of local
field offices by the Agency's headquarters, 7 6 contributed to its
growth.
171. Memorandum from John P. Torres, Dir., ICE, to Field Office Dirs. & Deputy
Field Office Dirs., ICE (Feb. 22,2007) (ICE.08-1450(1).000007) (on file with author).
172. See sources cited supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
173. See E-mail from Ronald E. LeFevre to redacted recipients (Aug. 1, 2006, 10:43)
(ICE.08-1450(11).000456) (on file with author) (celebrating reaching the goal of 100
stipulated removal orders a month, and suggesting that the office reach 200 a month).
174. E-mail from redacted sender to Terry Bird (Apr. 13, 1999, 10:30) (ICE-08-
1450(3)-000142) (on file with author) (responding to Bird's comment that for Mexican
nationals without criminal convictions, "[i]f these aliens are not criminals and are just from
Mexico then you may want to consider just giving them V.R. [voluntary return]").
175. See E-mail from Rene D. Mateo, Deputy Chief Counsel, ICE, to Theresa Scala
and Stuart Siegel (Apr. 2, 2007, 13:50) (ICE-1450(9).000642) (on file with author) (asking
for further clarification on the number of stipulated removal orders obtained by each
recipient and noting that Mateo wants to "get [them] additional recognition"); E-mail
from Ronald E. LeFevre, supra note 173; E-mail from redacted sender to redacted
recipients (Jan. 17, 2007, 13:39) (ICE-08-1450(5)-000298) (on file with author) (stating that
the Field Office Director "would like for us to offer Stipulated Removals for all those
cases currently being offered VRs [voluntary returns]" and directing agents to "establish a
weekly count" of Stipulated Removals); E-mail from redacted sender to Timothy S.
Aitken and Nancy Alcantar (Jan. 17, 2008, 14:27) (ICE.08-1450(11).000597) (on file with
author) (suggesting the creation of an "award specifically for stip cases"). The January 17,
2008 e-mail from the redacted sender to Aitken and Alcantar also suggested that "[t]he
easiest way may be to set goals, something like 25% of NTAs should be stipped and
maybe provide training," and noted that "[a]ll you need is one hard charging IEA to kick
out a bunch of stips to show it can be done." Id.
176. See E-mail from F. Venegas, Deputy Field Office Dir., ICE, to E. Gastelo, Acting
DCC, ELP-OCC (Aug. 6, 2008, 09:05) (ICE-08-1450(7).00002) (on file with author)
(noting that field office director "rated on" ability to reduce "average length of aliens in
our custody" and therefore encouraged use of stipulated removals).
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In addition to ICE, EOIR has played a central role in the
increase of stipulated removal orders. Immigration Judges' high
caseloads and case completion goals have provided an incentive for
them to sign stipulated removal orders without holding hearings. A
case with a stipulated removal order can be "closed" far more
quickly, with a single signature, than one in which the non-citizen has
multiple hearings, files motions, and provides testimony.17 Indeed,
one court administrator stated that "it would be devastating" to stop
doing stipulated removals, because the court "has only been able to
get by on its detained docket and stay true to case completion goals
because we do so many [stipulated removals,] which don't clog up the
dockets." 7 8
Stipulated removal orders in the mid-to-late 2000s have
accounted for anywhere between ten and thirty percent of all removal
orders issued by the federal government, depending on which agency
is reporting the numbers. According to internal EOIR data, between
2007 and 2009, on average, approximately 30,000 stipulated orders of
removal were entered each year 17 9-statistics that are consistent with
the limited public reporting of stipulated removals from ICE's Office
of Chief Counsel.8 0 However, many removal orders are not assigned
to either ICE counsel or an IJ at all. These orders, which include
177. See E-mail from Maria Jauregui, Court Adm'r, S.F. Immigration Court, to Loreto
S. Geisse, Judge, Exec. Office for Immigration Review (Oct. 23. 2007, 11:52) (EOIR-2008-
5140(5)-000060) (on file with author) ("If you [IJs] are [participating in signing stips],
please note that these cases will count as completions for the month, but as previously
mentioned must be reviewed and signed off on the same day.").
178. See E-mail from Scott McDaniel, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, to
Stephen Griswold and Scott Rosen, Exec. Office for Immigration Review (Apr. 25, 2008,
09:56) (EOIR-2008-5140(5)-000039) (noting also that a San Francisco court was able to
meet "case completion goals" due to large number of stipulated removals in jurisdiction)
(on file with author).
179. See KOH, SRIKANTIAH & TUMLIN, supra note 42, at 3.
180. In fiscal year 2008, ICE noted that just over 30,000-or almost thirty percent of all
final removal orders obtained by ICE attorneys-were stipulated orders. See U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE FISCAL YEAR 2008 ANNUAL
REPORT: PROTECTING NATIONAL SECURITY AND UPHOLDING PUBLIC SAFETY 28
(2009), available at http://cdml6064.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem
/collection/p266901coll4/id/2170/rec/4 [hereinafter ICE FISCAL YEAR 2008 REPORT] ("In
FY08, ICE attorneys obtained 91,374 final orders of removal; [sic] which included 30,707
stipulated orders of removal. ). For fiscal year 2009, ICE disclosed obtaining nearly
30,000 stipulated removal orders. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT FISCAL YEAR 2011 OVERVIEW: CONGRESSIONAL
JUSTIFICATION 18 (undated),
www.ice.gov/doclib/foialsecure communities/fy2011overviewcongressionaljustification.pdf
(stating that "[a] total of 29,012 cases were completed through the stipulated removal
process").
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reinstatements, expedited removals, or administrative removals, are
executed and issued by DHS through front-line immigration agents.
As a result, the total number of removal orders reported by DHS (the
parent agency) is significantly larger than the number of removal
orders accounted for by ICE's Office of Chief Counsel, as well as the
number of removal orders actually issued by an IJ. For instance, in
fiscal year 2008, ICE reported its attorneys as having "obtained"
91,374 final orders of removal,"'1 and EOIR reported 156,056 removal
orders issued by Us."' DHS, however, issued the far greater number
of 359,795 removals. 8 Thus, for 2008, the most recent year in which
data from multiple agency offices is available, stipulated removals
constituted nearly one-third of all final removal orders obtained by
ICE attorneys, nearly one-fifth of all removal orders issued by IJs,
and almost one-tenth of all removals issued by DHS.'" Despite the
relatively high proportion of stipulated removal orders, EOIR has
never publicly reported on-or even referenced-stipulated orders in
its annual yearbook of statistics. Notwithstanding the variations in
public reporting, this preliminary analysis shows that stipulated
removals have comprised a substantial percentage of all removal
orders entered each year, which is particularly high in comparison to
the scant attention they have received.
B. The Face of Stipulated Removal: Pro Se Immigrant Detainees
Data produced by EOIR indicates that most immigrants who
received stipulated orders were in immigration detention, did not
have lawyers (ninety-six percent), faced noncriminal grounds of
removal (eighty percent), and were from Mexico or Latin American
countries (ninety-eight percent). 85 Thus, unrepresented immigrant
181. See ICE FISCAL YEAR 2008 REPORT, supra note 180, at 28.
182. EOIR reported 182,720 total removals for fiscal year 2008. EXEC. OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK D2 (2011),
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy10syb.pdf. However, EOIR also stated that the total
number of removals includes voluntary departure, which numbered 26,684 in 2008. Id. at
01, D2 ("Orders of voluntary departure are included as removals."). Because voluntary
departure is technically a form of immigration relief, a more accurate number of removal
orders issued by EOIR for FY 2008 should not account for voluntary departure, thus
bringing the total number of removal orders issued by EOIR to 156,036.
183. DHS,2010 YEARBOOK, supra note 29, at 94 (defining removals as orders that lead
to "administrative or criminal consequences placed on subsequent reentry").
184. The ICE Office of Chief Counsel has not made stipulated removal order numbers
available after fiscal year 2008.
185. See KOH, SRIKANTIAH & TUMLIN, supra note 42, at 1 (analyzing data received
from the EOIR). That ninety-eight percent of stipulated removal recipients came from
Mexico or Latin American countries reinforces the longstanding link between immigration
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detainees from Spanish-speaking countries who have not been
convicted of a removable offense are, overwhelmingly, the recipients
of stipulated removal.
The specific selection criteria, as well as the frequency, timing,
and extent of the use of stipulated removal orders appear to depend
on the discretion of Agency officials at the local level. At the Eloy,
Arizona detention facility, for instance, ICE agents have been
instructed to use stipulated removal for immigrant detainees who are
Mexican citizens, in the United States for less than ten years, and who
are charged with unlawful entry to the United States.' In other
jurisdictions, ICE has used stipulated removal for non-citizens
charged with unlawful entry-but not, say, crime-based grounds of
removal-without regard to their length of residence." Neither the
stipulated removal statute, regulations, nor any internal agency
guidance bars its use for juveniles, the mentally ill, or lawful
permanent residents.' 8 Some internal government documents suggest
that stipulated orders of removal may have been entered against
juveniles, the mentally ill, and the physically disabled. 18
policy and race. See Keith Aoki & Kevin R. Johnson, Latinos and the Law: Cases and
Materials: The Need for Focus in Critical Analysis, 12 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 73, 92
(2009) (linking modern immigration enforcement to ongoing conversations in "LatCrit,"
such as the concept of "discrimination by proxy").
186. See United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir. 2010). The prohibition on
using stipulated removal on non-citizens who have lived in the country for over ten years
appears aimed at preventing its use on immigrants who are potentially eligible for one
form of relief from removal known as "cancellation of removal." See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)
(2006) (requiring, inter alia, ten years' physical presence in the United States to apply for
cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent residents).
187. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SAN ANTONIO FIELD
OFFICE, STIPULATED FINAL ORDER OF REMOVALS: STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES (2008) (ICE-08-1450(4)-000148) (on file with author) ("At this moment, we
are only processing all EWI and overstays without convictions alleged in the NTA.") (on
file with author); Memorandum from Brent L. Perkins, Court Adm'r, Exec. Office for
Immigration Review, to All NTA-Issuing Posts, Dep't of Homeland Sec., San Diego
(undated) (EOIR-2008-5140(6)-000582) ("There must be only one charge on the NTA
and that is under section 212(a)(6)(A)(I) of the [INA], present without inspection or
parole.").
188. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2012).
189. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, CHIEF COUNSEL
OFFICES RESPONSES: STIPULATED REMOVAL PROCESS 2, 4, 9, 14-15 (Feb. 10, 2006)
(ICE-08-1450(13).000222) (on file with author) (noting that an IJ in Houston/Huntsville
area "agreed to expand to juvenile program" and referencing a note from the Baltimore
Chief Counsel indicating the "use Stipulated Removal in the cases of aliens who have been
found not criminally responsible and who are detained at a state mental institution"); E-
mail from redacted sender to redacted recipients (Aug. 10, 2005, 07:01) (on file with
author) (ICE.06-23467-000512) (referencing the use of stipulated removal in case
involving "a paraplegic with bed sore problems").
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C. Roles of Institutional Players and De Facto Stipulated Removal
"Procedure"
The federal statute and regulations governing stipulated removal
contain only minimal guidance as to the procedures to be employed
by the Agency.'" Three phases constitute the de facto process that
has nonetheless developed in practice: (1) a "solicitation phase," in
which ICE agents describe stipulated removal orders to immigrants
and solicit their signatures on the stipulated removal requests; 91 (2)
review and concurrence by ICE attorneys;" and (3) review and
signature by IJs.'9s At no point does the process ensure that the
immigrant, who is usually in detention, consults with an attorney or
receives a neutral explanation of the process from a judge or other
government official who does not have an interest in increasing the
number of removal orders issued.194
1. Role of ICE Agents: Solicitation Phase
Typically, during the solicitation process, ICE officials approach
immigrant detainees, either in groups or individually, to describe the
stipulated removal process and solicit participation in the program.195
ICE agents are not required to screen detainees' cases to determine,
for instance, if they might be eligible to apply for release from
detention on bond or apply for relief from removal.96 Since most
recipients of stipulated removal do not have lawyers or access to legal
information, ICE agents are usually the immigrants' sole source of
information about their options and the law. No legal authority
directly regulates the conduct of ICE agents who approach immigrant
detainees about stipulated orders of removal. The practical potential
for language barriers and coercion to pervade the solicitation phase
was articulated in one e-mail from an Agency official:
The [stipulated removal] program is allowed by regulation, but
it is implemented by personal relationships. The reality is that
we are asking the [IJ and the ICE attorney] to rely on a non-
190. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2012).
191. See infra Part III.C.1.
192. See infra Part III.C.2.
193. See infra Part III.C.3.
194. See infra Parts III.C.1-3.
195. See United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing use of
group presentations for stipulated removal at Eloy, Arizona immigration detention
facility).
196. Nothing in the federal regulation requires ICE agents to review cases for potential
eligibility for release on bond or relief from removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2012).
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attorney to accurately discharge the legal requirements and also
to be honest-after all it would be really easy to trick an
illiterate non-English speaker into signing a request for a stip
order.1 7
In the absence of any guidance on how ICE officers should
explain stipulated removal to detainees, informal explanations that
reflect the interests of ICE have developed to fill the void. Internal
government scripts that ICE agents have apparently used in at least
some jurisdictions suggest that immigrants systematically have
received inaccurate and misleading information about their rights. 9
ICE agents have used the threat of longer detention in order to
convince detainees to waive their rights through a stipulated removal
order. Agents have relied on scripts that emphasize, for instance, that
it may take "a month" to see a judge for the first time, but that a
stipulated removal order "eliminates/cuts the time in half," and that
presenting one's entire case to the judge could take between "six
months and three years"19  This same script contains obvious
misstatements about detainees' legal options and omissions regarding
the civil and criminal consequences associated with signing a
stipulated order of removal.'o Thus, despite the fact that eligibility
for immigration relief often involves a complex analysis of multiple
legal and factual questions (including, but not at all limited to,
whether they were the victim of a crime 201 or fear persecution in their
home country2"), the script states that the "only" way for detainees to
"fix [their] papers" is through certain family relationships. 203 The
script says nothing about the possibility of detainees being United
States citizens. It then goes on to incorrectly list forms of immigration
status that can be obtained through family relationships.0  Although
many non-citizens who are initially detained are eligible for bond, the
script provides false information about their rights to seek bond and
197. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 187 (describing
the stipulated removal program in Memphis, Tennessee).
198. See, e.g., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, STIPS
PRESENTATION (SPANISH) (undated) (ICE-08-1450(6)-000066) (on file with author).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2006) (providing nonimmigrant status to certain
victims of specified crimes).
202. See id. § 1158(h)(1)(B)(i).
203. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 198.
204. See id. (stating that brother and sisters of "residents" can qualify for relief). In
fact, lawful permanent residents have no right to petition for their siblings' immigration
status, although adult U.S. citizens can petition for their siblings. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(4)
(2006).
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discourages them from even asking for bond. For instance, the script
states that a person with "any charge related to drugs, any charge ...
related to hitting another person like assault or battery, [or] any
charge that is a felony resulting in a sentence of 180 days or more,"
will be "automatically disqualified" from receiving bond, and that "it
is most probable that you will be denied" 20 -even though the
immigration laws contain no such bar on the ability to obtain bond
under such circumstances. Furthermore, the script neglects to explain
the alternative of voluntary departure, which would allow a non-
citizen to leave the country, reduce their time in detention, and avoid
the civil and criminal penalties that potentially accompany receiving a
formal order of removal.206
Poor translation appears to have distorted ICE agents'
conversations with non-citizens during the solicitation stage. The
script discussed above, for instance, is written in broken Spanish,
replete with confusing and condescending language that exacerbates
the error in the script itself.20 As highlighted in the Introduction, an
ICE agent in Eloy, Arizona regularly asked, in "nonsensical" and
"unintelligible" Spanish, a question she understood to mean, "do you
want to fight your case or want to sign?"208 Some IJs have seen the
language problems inherent in relying on ICE protocols. As one
judge stated, "Having seen [ICE officers' Spanish language]
proficiency up close[,J I'm not sure their Spanish is sufficient to
communicate to the degree necessary for a stipulated removal."209
Against this context, at the end of the solicitation process, an
immigrant detainee may sign a preprinted form that states that the
waiver of rights was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.210
Reports of immigration advocates around the country have
confirmed that ICE agents who present stipulated orders of removal
have left a number of detainees confused about their legal options
and feeling pressured to accept stipulated orders of removal.' ICE
205. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 198.
206. See supra note 71 (discussing voluntary departure).
207. See KOH, SRIKANTIAH & TUMLIN, supra note 42, at 10 & n.43.
208. United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir. 2010).
209. E-mail from Agnelis Reese to Larry Dean (Aug. 1, 2008, 03:21) (EOIR-2008-
5140(4).000058) (on file with author).
210. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b)(6) (2012) (requiring that a request for stipulated
removal order contain "[a] statement that the alien understands the consequences of the
stipulated request and that the alien enters the request voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently").
211. See, e.g., Paloma Esquivel, Many Deportees Unwittingly Wave Rights, Report Says,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2011, at AA1 (referring to a statement of Karen Tumlin, managing
attorney at National Immigration Law Center, describing over a dozen interviews with
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agents have reportedly told detainees who are actually eligible for
relief that their only viable option is to accept a stipulated order,
sometimes in a language that is unintelligible to them.212 Certainly,
agreeing to a stipulated removal order may represent the best option
for some immigrants, particularly if they are not eligible for any
immigration relief, including voluntary departure. However, the legal
framework places few constraints on ICE agents' actions, despite the
fact that detainees remain heavily reliant on those agents.
2. Role of ICE Attorneys: Representing
the Government's Interests
Should the non-citizen sign the request for the stipulated
removal order, the documentation must be reviewed and signed first
by an ICE attorney, and then by an IJ, in order to become final."
Like the solicitation phase, the statute and regulations provide no
guidance regarding this review process. ICE attorneys who sign
stipulated removal requests on behalf of ICE appear to take the
position that they have no obligation to review the non-citizen's
records for eligibility for relief, nor do they review the requests for
evidence that the non-citizen's waiver of rights was valid.214 Claims to
U.S. citizenship should receive heightened scrutiny under the
immigration laws,215 and the law is sufficiently complex that it is not
always apparent whether an individual is a citizen.216 However, the
EOIR-endorsed stipulated removal forms issued in 2010 require no
immigrant detainees at Mira Loma Detention Center in Lancaster, California, who signed
stipulated orders of removal and "had absolutely no idea what the legal consequences
were").
212. See sources cited supra notes 195-207 and accompanying text.
213. See § 1003.25(b).
214. See E-mail from Paul Nishie to Patricia Spaletta, Erin Lopez, Cara Cutler,
Jennifer Castro, Margaret Curry and Sherry Nohara (Aug. 23, 2007) (ICE.08-
1450(9).001158) (on file with author) (stating that "OCC [Office of Chief Counsel] will not
reject stips on the grounds that an alien may be eligible for relief"). EOIR's recent
revision of the stipulated removal forms requires an ICE attorney to sign a statement
indicating that the non-citizen has not already applied to the Agency for a few specified
forms of relief, a level of review that does not involve identifying potential forms of relief
for the non-citizen. See Memorandum from Brian M. O'Leary, supra note 39.
215. The stated policy of ICE is to "ensure claims to U.S. citizenship receive immediate
and careful investigation and analysis." See Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant
Sec'y of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to Field Office Dirs., Special Agents in
Charge, and Chief Counsels (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-
reform/pdf/usc-guidance-nov_2009.pdf (noting that "[ais a matter of law, ICE cannot
assert its civil immigration enforcement authority to arrest and/or detain a [U.S. citizen]").
216. See Stevens, supra note 64, at 684-713 (analyzing cases involving claims to
citizenship that required courts to engage in close readings of state family laws, prior
versions of federal immigration statutes, and factual records).
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more from the ICE attorney than an attestation that the individual
has not already filed a claim to U.S. citizenship, with no obligation to
affirmatively review the file for a cognizable claim of citizenship.217
Indeed, ICE attorneys typically have no direct contact with non-
citizens during the stipulated order of removal process.2 18 In at least
one jurisdiction, ICE attorneys were encouraged to spend no more
than seven or eight minutes on the review process.2 19 It appears, based
on initial evidence of the program, that ICE attorneys act primarily to
rubber-stamp agents' requests for stipulated orders.
3. Role of Immigration Judges: Rubber Stamps
or Dissenting Voices
In most cases, the bulk of the paperwork related to a stipulated
order of removal appears to occur prior to the non-citizen's first court
appearance, known as the "master calendar hearing."2 20 Once the
non-citizen and a DHS attorney sign the request, the stipulated order
request then proceeds to an IJ for final review and issuance of the
removal order.22 ' In accordance with the regulation, the IJ must
determine the validity of the non-citizen's waiver. 222 In the absence of
a hearing, the IJ relies entirely on the boilerplate form signed by the
detainee that states, pursuant to the regulation, that the waiver was
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.22 IJs have responded to the rise
in stipulated orders of removal in drastically different ways. Not
surprisingly, stipulated removal is implemented in a disparate manner
across the country. Some jurisdictions used stipulated orders of
217. See Memorandum from Brian M. O'Leary, supra note 39, at 8 (requiring an ICE
attorney to sign a statement indicating that review of the alien registration file "do[es] not
reflect" that non-citizen has filed a claim to U.S. citizenship, an application for legalization
under sections 210 or 245A of the INA, or has an approved visa petition that is pending
with the Agency).
218. A review of the documents produced by ICE and EOIR, together with the federal
regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b), suggests that ICE attorneys conduct a paper review of
the non-citizen's file only. See also id. (discussing the standard concurrence signed by ICE
attorneys on stipulated removal request forms).
219. See E-mail from Jim Stolley, to Ronald LeFevre, Leonard Rosenberg, and Leslie
Ungerman (Nov. 8, 2006, 08:51) (ICE.08-1450(11).000481) (on file with author) (stating
that "fifteen minutes is way too long" a period of time for a DHS trial attorney to review a
stipulated removal order for legal sufficiency and instructing recipient to "[c]ut that in
half").
220. See BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 18, at 81.
221. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2012); see also Memorandum from Brian M. O'Leary,
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removal in nearly fifty percent of all completed matters in 2009 and
2010, and others have used them less than one percent of the time, if
at all.224
Some judges, concerned with the potential for abuse in the
program, have generally refused to rubber-stamp stipulated orders
without holding in-person hearings in order to confirm the validity of
the immigrant's waiver. 225 For example, one IJ stated in an e-mail that
he "has determined that the waiver is not knowing in almost all
occasions," in large part because "in unrepresented cases. .. the alien
is told that if he wants [to] get out of jail he should sign this paper."226
Other IJs have echoed similar concerns, noting that non-citizens are
told that ICE agents "just told them to sign" 27 or had identified cases
where non-citizens were statutorily eligible for relief from removal."
The attitude held by these IJs appears to reflect a perception that Js
have a duty to conduct a requisite level of due diligence into the cases
that form the basis for a removal order.229
Certain Us' reluctance to sign stipulated orders in the absence of
hearings has led ICE to generally view these Us as barriers to the
224. See BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 18, at 128 (showing stipulated removals as
approximately fifty percent of completed proceedings in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 in Salt
Lake City, and less than one percent in locations including San Antonio, Boston, and
Miami).
225. See, e.g., E-mail from Christopher Shanahan, Field Office Dir., New York, ICE, to
Marisa Flores (Feb. 28, 2008, 10:33) (ICE-08-1450(6).000134) (on file with author)
(indicating that the chief IJ and court administration in New York City "stated clearly that
they will not do Stipulated Removal Orders without having the detainee brought to
court"); see also E-mail from James Grable to Donald Cassidy (Jan. 23, 2007, 09:48)
(ICE.08-1450(9).273) (on file with author) (explaining that IJs in San Juan and Buffalo
require court appearances for unrepresented aliens).
226. E-mail from Anne Greer to EOIR Officials (June 15, 2006, 14:40) (EOIR-2008-
5140(8)-000084) (on file with author).
227. E-mail from James Vandello to Alan Vomacka (Jan. 26, 2007) (EOIR-2008-
5140(4)-000218) (on file with author).
228. See E-mail from redacted sender to redacted recipient (Dec. 14, 2004) (ICE-08-
1450(3).000294) (on file with author) (discussing cases where the IJ found the non-citizen
eligible for relief from removal but had signed a request for stipulated removal order); E-
mail from Magdalena Ramos to Vivian Reyes-Lopez, Crimilda Guilloty-Dorsey, Jorge
Ramos (Feb. 13, 2007) (ICE.08-1450(10).000648) (on file with author) (noting than an IJ
rejected stipulated removal orders because the "alien could possibly have a relief from
removal").
229. In addition to the documentary evidence of certain Us' misapprehensions about
signing stipulated removal orders without holding a hearing, according to one scholar, an
IJ "who insists on 'thoroughly questioning' people who sign these orders 'regularly
encounters U.S. citizens.'" Jacqueline Stevens, Lawless Courts, THE NATION (Oct. 20,
2010), http://www.thenation.com/print/article/155497/lawless-courts (quoting Professor
Rachel Rosenbloom, who also stated that "[t]here are many judges who don't question
people, and it's very likely there's going to be US citizens among those people as well, and
they're not being [identified]").
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implementation of stipulated removals.23 0 ICE officials have made
abundantly clear that they view the absence of in-person hearings as a
fundamental characteristic of the stipulated removal program and
that to hold hearings would invalidate the very purpose of the
practice.' The relationship between Us' willingness to sign stipulated
removal orders without holding a colloquy with the non-citizen and
the "success"232 of the stipulated removal program in particular
jurisdictions has been a subject of regular discussion in inter- and
intra-agency communications and meetings. 233 At one DHS-EOIR
liaison meeting, for instance, the agenda listed ICE's concern that
"some immigration judges are not accepting stipulated orders [and]
others are requiring in-person interviews before accepting any such
orders." 234 Another internal document, compiling the informal
responses of DHS Chief Counsels for ICE offices across the country,
contained notes indicating ICE's concern that IJs would not sign
stipulated removal orders in certain jurisdictions without first holding
in-person hearings.235
In other jurisdictions, ICE has successfully used stipulated
orders, notwithstanding individual judges who insist on in-person
hearings to test the validity of the waiver, by routing all requests to
specific IJs who do sign them without holding hearings. 23 6 An internal
ICE document purporting to reflect the practices of various
jurisdictions reported that, in one Southern California detention
facility, a number of Us "won't do [stipulated removals]," but that the
single IJ willing to sign them "is staying until 8:00 pm many evenings
230. See, e.g., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., AGENDA FOR DHS/EOIR LIAISON
MEETING 2 (Oct. 4, 2007) (ICE.08-1450(13).000023) (on file with author).
231. See, e.g., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 189
(describing the "less successful" stipulated removal programs as those where "many" Us
hold hearings to determine whether the non-citizen's waiver is valid, a practice which the
document refers to as "making the use of a stipulated order pointless").
232. Id.
233. See IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., FISCAL YEAR 2011 OVERVIEW CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 50,
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure-communities/fy20lloverviewcongressionaljustificati
on.pdf (noting the "inconsistent application or acceptance of stipulated removal process,"
and describing the creation of DHS-DOJ intra-agency working group "to resolve the
issues which will allow all eligible detained aliens to request stipulated removal orders").
234. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 230, at 2.
235. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 189 (noting
that in Boston, Buffalo, Honolulu, Houston, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York,
Newark, Phoenix, San Antonio, San Juan and Seattle, at least one-and in some cases
all--of the IJs will not sign stipulated removal orders without a hearing).
236. Id.
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to complete" the orders .2 The same document described the use of
stipulated removal in the Northwest United States, which indicated
that "[the ICE Office of Chief Counsel has] approximately 1,000 stips
a year." According to the document, stipulated removals in the region
are "centralized in that they are signed off on by the Seattle Us"
because the IJ in Portland "does not sign off on any of them
eventhough [sic] the Portland attorneys may be reviewing and
forwarding to EOIR."238 An internal e-mail written at the start of
stipulated removal's expansion unapologetically reported that ICE
has "asked" that one IJ in Eloy, Arizona, "not be assigned any
[stipulated removal orders], and EOIR, recognizing the
reasonableness of excluding him, has cooperated."3 9 Indeed, EOIR
data suggests that roughly ten percent of the entire immigration
bench has been responsible for the majority of stipulated removals
entered through mid-2010.240 And in just over a three year time
period, a single IJ in Miami, Florida, signed almost 10,000 stipulated
removal orders.241
At least in part as a response to disparity in IJs' treatment of
stipulated orders, in September 2010, EOIR released an internal
policy memo, in conjunction with ICE, that issued uniform forms for
stipulated removal requests and implicitly discourages IJs from
holding in-person hearings to confirm the validity of the waivers.242
The internal memo assumes, without further explanation, that a non-
citizen's signature on the forms is sufficient proof that the waiver of
rights is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and nowhere discusses
how-beyond a review of the boilerplate forms-the IJ should
confirm the validity of the non-citizen's waiver.243
237. Id. at 230.
238. Id. at 246.
239. E-mail from Patricia Vroom to Bill Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, ICE (Jan. 4,
2004) (ICE.08-1450(13).000205) (on file with author).
240. See KOH, SRIKANTIAH & TUMLIN, supra note 42, at 14 ("In the past decade,
according to EOIR's own data, over 100,000 of the almost 160,000 stipulated removal
orders entered were signed by only 20 immigration judges across the country."); see also
ANNA 0. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS 21 (2010) (noting
that 226 Us sit on the immigration bench).
241. See KOH, SRIKANTIAH & TUMLIN, supra note 42, at 14 (9,642 orders were signed
by IJ Rex Ford) (original data on file with author).
242. See Memorandum from Brian M. O'Leary, supra note 39, at 2.
243. Id.
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IV. STIPULATED REMOVAL AND THE PROBLEM OF DUE PROCESS
This Part explores the due process implications of stipulated
orders of removal. It first discusses the Supreme Court's holding that
non-citizens who are criminally prosecuted for illegal re-entry may
collaterally attack a prior removal order, as well as a recent illegal re-
entry case from the Ninth Circuit that casts doubt on the validity of
stipulated removal orders. It then places stipulated orders of removal
under the familiar Mathews v. Eldridge procedural due process
framework and concludes that the program in its current form-one
involving waivers of rights that occur solely on paper and in the
depths of immigration detention facilities with only the illusion of IJ
review-runs afoul of due process.
A. Evaluating Stipulated Removal Through the Lens of Illegal Re-
Entry
Despite the relatively significant numbers of stipulated orders
entered in the mid- to late-2000s, the federal courts have had minimal
opportunities to review the stipulated removal process.' However,
criminal prosecutions for illegal re-entry have provided the courts
with some opportunity to evaluate stipulated orders of removal. The
leading case explaining the availability of judicial review over
removal orders used as basis for illegal re-entry prosecutions is United
States v. Mendoza-Lopez.2 45 In Mendoza-Lopez, the Supreme Court
held that a non-citizen facing a criminal charge of illegal re-entry has
the Fifth Amendment due process right to collaterally attack the
underlying deportation order where the civil immigration proceedings
deprived the non-citizen of judicial review.2 46 Congress later codified
the right to collaterally attack a removal order in the illegal re-entry
statute,247 thereby giving rise to a body of case law in the criminal
context that provides guidance on the immigration courts' adherence
to due process principles.
Mendoza-Lopez also shed light on the obligations of IJs and the
sufficiency of waivers obtained in immigration proceedings. The case
244. See supra text accompanying notes 140-44 (discussing lack of public and judicial
scrutiny of stipulated removal).
245. 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
246. Id. at 829.
247. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 308(d)(4)(J), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-618 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1326(d) (2006)) (providing for collateral attack and requiring (1) exhaustion of
administrative remedies, (2) that the underlying proceedings "improperly deprived" the
non-citizen of judicial review, and (3) that "entry of the order was fundamentally unfair").
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arose out of the criminal prosecutions of two immigrants, both of
whom had received their initial deportation orders after group
hearings before an 11.248 They claimed that the IJ had failed to advise
them of their right to counsel as well as of their right to apply for
relief from deportation. 24 9 Because the federal government had
conceded that the removal proceedings were fundamentally unfair,
the Court did not engage in a detailed analysis of the IJ's actions.
However, the Court agreed that the "Immigration Judge permitted
waivers of the right to appeal that were not the result of considered
judgments by respondents, and failed to advise respondents properly
of their eligibility to apply for" a form of immigration relief known as
suspension of deportation.5 0 The Court thus found that "the waivers
of their rights to appeal were not considered or intelligent,"251 thus
suggesting that the validity of a rights waiver would come under
question where the non-citizen was unaware of available alternatives
and where the IJ failed to issue an adequate advisal to the non-
citizen.
In United States v. Ramos,2 ' a decision issued in September 2010,
the Ninth Circuit found due process and regulatory violations with a
stipulated removal order executed in Eloy, Arizona." The Ninth
Circuit is the only federal appeals court to have evaluated the
constitutional validity of stipulated removal orders. The court
identified three main due process and regulatory deficiencies in the
stipulated removal order signed by Isaac Ramos, whose case is
described in the Introduction to this Article. First, it found that Mr.
Ramos had not validly waived his right to appeal the removal
order.254 Mr. Ramos had been presented with a written form that was
translated into Spanish, listed the rights he was waiving, and stated
that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights.255
Nonetheless, the court emphasized the ICE agent's lack of Spanish
language proficiency and the lack of any other evidence that he could
understand the questions asked of him. 25 6 Moreover, the court
stressed that without either counsel257 or a hearing before an IJ, Mr.
248. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 830.
249. Id. at 831.
250. Id. at 840.
251. Id.
252. 623 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 240 (2011).
253. Id. at 675.
254. Id. at 680.
255. Id. at 677.
256. Id. at 680-81.
257. Id. at 681.
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Ramos's only source of legal information came from an "immigration
enforcement agent or deportation officer."" Relying on case law
upholding the requirement that Us inform non-citizens of eligibility
for relief and the consequences of a removal order, the Ramos court
found that Mr. Ramos "failed to receive the benefit of procedural
safeguards necessary to ensure a valid waiver of the right to
appeal." 259
Second, the Ramos court found that the right to counsel had
been invalidly waived.'o Noting that non-citizens in removal
proceedings have no Sixth Amendment right to government-
appointed counsel, the court drew attention to the obligation of the IJ
to inquire into a non-citizen's desire for counsel and to assess whether
a waiver of the right to counsel is voluntary and knowing.261' The court
also rejected the government's argument that because Mr. Ramos had
waived the right to counsel in writing, the IJ had no further obligation
to assess the validity of the waiver.262 In response to the government's
argument that the written nature of the waiver served as proof of its
validity, the Court emphasized that "[t]he key question is whether the
waiver is 'knowing and intelligent,' not whether it is verbal or
written."263
Third, given the explicit regulatory requirement that the U
"determine that the alien's waiver is voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent," 21 the Ramos court found that EOIR had failed to follow
its own rules. Stating that "[s]hortcuts frequently turn out to be
mistakes," 26 5 the court emphasized that, by signing the stipulated
removal order, the IJ had failed to conduct any "independent
inquiry" and instead "depend[ed] solely on information provided by
DHS."1266
The Ramos decision has given rise to some changes in the
government's practices related to stipulated removal, at least in the
Ninth Circuit. Stipulated removal orders appear to have continued in
258. Id.
259. Id. at 682.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 682-83.
263. Id. at 682.
264. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2012),
265. Ramos, 623 F.3d at 683 (citing Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir.
2002)).
266. Id. at 683.
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the Ninth Circuit since Ramos,267 although shortly after the decision
was issued, at least some IJs interpreted the opinion to mean that
stipulated orders of removal should cease completely. 268 The decision
also impacted federal prosecutors' offices. The U.S. Attorney's Office
in San Diego appears to have refrained from seeking criminal
prosecutions for illegal re-entry where the underlying removal order
was a stipulated removal order,269 and it has readily conceded the
defectiveness of stipulated removal orders in subsequent litigation.2 70
Outside the Ninth Circuit, however, the effects of Ramos remain
to be seen. A skeptic might point to Ramos as an example of the
Ninth Circuit's reputation as a liberal court that makes it an outlier
with respect to immigration and criminal law, among other matters.
The following Section explains why Ramos has implications beyond
the four corners of Isaac Ramos's case and correctly treats stipulated
removal's current use as a failure under procedural due process
standards.
B. Evaluating Stipulated Removal Through Mathews v. Eldridge
Under the Supreme Court's well-known holding in Mathews v.
Eldridge, whether a particular procedural protection is necessary
hinges on the balance among several factors, namely: (1) the private
interests affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation of those interests through the procedures used and the
value of additional procedures; and (3) the government's interest,
267. See Telephone Interview with Erika Pinheiro, Det. Att'y, Esperanza Immigrants'
Rights Project at Catholic Charities, Inc. (Aug. 20, 2012) (confirming that IJs continue to
sign stipulated removal orders in Mira Loma Detention Facility in Lancaster, California,
and that the regular practice is to not hold in-person hearings prior to signing the order).
268. Months after the decision, the government argued that the decision had been
"read by immigration judges as requiring a complete halt to stipulated removals across the
Ninth Circuit" and requested that the court of appeals amend the opinion. In response, the
Court stated that such a reading was "incorrect," reiterated that the decision simply
required that stipulated removal orders be obtained in a manner to ensure that waivers
were intelligent, knowing, and voluntary, and instructed the United States to "reread the
opinion." United States v. Ramos, No. 09-50059 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 2010) (order denying
motion to amend opinion).
269. See Sandra Dibble, Questions Raised About Deportees Re-Entries, U.T. SAN
DIEGO, Aug. 20, 2011, http://www.utsandiego.comlnews/2011/aug/20/questions-raised-
about-deportees-repeated-re/ (quoting U.S. Attorney Lauren Duffy of San Diego region
stating that individuals found with prior stipulated removal orders are generally not
prosecuted for illegal re-entry).
270. See United States v. Rodriguez-Ocampo, 664 F.3d 1275, 1276 (9th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (conceding constitutional defects in prior stipulated removal order); United States
v. Penaloza-Mejia, No. CR-10-2116-EFS, 2011 WL 293877, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 27,
2011) ("The USAO does not dispute that the underlying deportation proceedings were
defective.").
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including the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or new
procedures would create. 71 In setting forth this framework, the Court
emphasized that due process "is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances" but
requires that "the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be
made, to 'the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be
heard' to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to
present their case." 2 72 Eldridge, which involved the termination of
social security benefits without a hearing, has been invoked
frequently in the civil commitment context and in immigration
proceedings.2 73 Under the Eldridge civil due process framework, the
use of stipulated orders of removal on unrepresented non-citizens
facing removal fails.
1. Private Interests at Stake
The most obvious private interest implicated by the stipulated
order of removal program is the non-citizen's ability to remain in the
United States. Although the Court has repeatedly refused to
characterize deportation as a form of criminal punishment, it has
recognized the profound impact that deportation can have on a non-
citizen, noting, for instance, that "deportation is a drastic measure
and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile."274 The liberty
interests at stake with removal decisions apply with particular force to
lawful permanent residents ("LPRs"). The strength of LPRs' liberty
interests is underscored by their lawful presence and generally deep
271. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
272. Id. at 334, 349 (internal citation omitted).
273. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (acknowledging the due
process argument under Eldridge and remanding to court of appeals); Walters v. Reno,
145 F.3d 1032, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding violations of procedural due process under
Eldridge where forms issued to aliens charged with document fraud failed to advise of
rights and resulted in automatic deportation); Alice Clapman, Hearing Difficult Voices:
The Due Process Rights of Mentally Disabled Individuals in Removal Proceedings, 45 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 373, 395 (2011) (applying Eldridge to the right for mentally disabled
individuals in removal proceedings to counsel); C6sar Cuauhtdmoc Garcia Hernindez,
Due Process and Immigrant Detainee Prison Transfers: Moving LPRs to Isolated Prisons
Violates Their Right to Counsel, 21 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 17, 24 (2011) (arguing that
the DHS policy of transferring detained LPRs constitutes violation of due process under
Eldridge).
274. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); see also Landon, 459 U.S. at 34
(noting that an alien's interest in deportation proceedings "is, without question, a weighty
one" because "[s]he stands to lose the right 'to stay and live and work in this land of
freedom' " (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945))).
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ties to the country. Indeed, LPRs have been described by one scholar
as "Americans in waiting."2 75
In the cases of non-LPRs, particularly undocumented
immigrants, the liberty interest in remaining in the country is
arguably weaker but still cognizable. Many undocumented
immigrants develop strong ties to the United States that are akin to
those of lawful permanent residents. 276 An increasing number of
undocumented immigrants live in the United States for long periods
and have family, communal, and personal ties to the country such that
deportation would strip them, in the Supreme Court's words, of "all
that makes life worth living."277 Efforts to pass the DREAM Act18 in
the mid- to late- 2000s and the Obama Administration's attempts to
expand the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 7 1 (including the
categorical extension of administrative discretion to youth who would
have benefited under the DREAM Act)280 in 2011 and 2012 also
strengthen undocumented person's liberty claims, albeit indirectly.
Such initiatives illustrate a growing (though not majority) consensus
that large swaths of the undocumented population have claims to
reside in the United States that are philosophically and (to some
degree) politically persuasive, even if not fully accounted for by the
current statutory framework.
In light of the strength of a non-citizen's liberty interest in
remaining in the United States, the courts have consistently
275. See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006).
276. For instance, one study found that thirty-seven percent of undocumented adults
have U.S. citizen children. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, A PORTRAIT OF
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2009),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf. Another study indicated that forty-five
percent of undocumented immigrants live with a spouse or child(ren), compared to
twenty-one percent of U.S. born adults, indicating the existence of strong family ties
amongst the undocumented population. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & PAUL TAYLOR,
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR U.S.-BORN CHILDREN 4 (2010),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/125.pdf.
277. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276,284 (1922).
278. The DREAM Act would provide lawful status to undocumented immigrants who
came to the United States as children and either attend college or enroll in the military.
See Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010 (DREAM Act), S.
3992, 111th Cong. (2010).
279. See generally Wadhia, supra note 154 (discussing the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion).
280. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., to David V.
Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir.,
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement 1 (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrarylassets/s1-exercising-
prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
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recognized that procedural due process requires a fundamentally fair
hearing or other procedure to effectuate removal."' These
constitutionally grounded rights are reflected in the INA and in the
federal immigration regulations,28 2 and they apply equally to LPRs
and non-LPRs alike. Several key components of a fundamentally
fair hearing include being properly advised of the right to appeal an
IJ's decision, the right to obtain counsel at one's own expense, and
the right to apply for relief from removal-deprivations of which have
been construed by the courts as violations of procedural due
process2"
A related liberty interest arguably implicated by the stipulated
removal order framework is the right to pursue the procedures
designed for non-citizens in removal proceedings, such as an
immigration court hearing and any relevant applications for relief.
Indeed, the courts have used flexible definitions of liberty.285 Thus,
the Fifth Circuit found a protected interest at stake where
immigration officials, including IJs, engaged in an "accelerated
processing" system that effectively denied all Haitian nationals the
right to apply for asylum2 6 Although the court declined to squarely
characterize the private interest in that case as either a liberty or
property interest, it emphasized that due process is violated when
the government "creates a right to petition"-28  for instance through
the promulgation of regulations describing the process of applying for
asylum2 89-"and then makes the exercise of that right utterly
281. See sources cited supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
282. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4) (2006) (right to counsel); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(5) (2006)
(requiring an IJ to affirmatively "inform the alien of the right to appeal" if ordered
removed); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3 (2012) (affected parties "shall be given notice of the
opportunity for filing an appeal"); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(b) (2012) (IJs "shall" advise of the
consequences of filing post-decision motions to reopen or reconsider).
283. See Dakane v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1273 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (right to effective representation); Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1984)
(right to adequate interpretation); Najaf-Ali v. Meese, 653 F. Supp. 833, 837 (N.D. Cal.
1987) (right to present witnesses and right to fair hearing).
284. See sources cited supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
285. See J. Bruce Bennett, The Rights of Licensed Professionals to Notice and Hearing
in Agency Enforcement Actions, 7 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 205, 209 (2006) ("[T]he U.S.
Supreme Court has made clear that the meaning of liberty is broad indeed and includes a
person's right to engage in any of the common occupations of life.").
286. See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1029-32 (5th Cir. 1982)
(describing the efforts of government to stem backlog in immigration court cases through
a "Haitian program," resulting in zero grants of asylum out of 4,000 Haitians processed).
287. Id. at 1039,
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1040.
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impossible."290 One might similarly find a protected interest at stake
that is sufficient enough to invoke the Eldridge framework in all
immigration cases, insofar as the government has created, through
statute and regulation, a series of procedures through which non-
citizens facing removal may appear before the immigration courts and
apply for relief for which they are eligible.291
A final relevant interest is the right to physical liberty. In the
context of stipulated orders of removal, the vast majority of which are
used on immigrant detainees, the interest in being free from
detention weighs heavily on the due process analysis. A liberty
interest in remaining free from incarceration applies in two ways to
stipulated removal. First, non-citizens have an interest in avoiding
civil immigration detention during the removal proceedings or
pending physical removal. Indeed, in Zadvydas v. Davis,292 the
Supreme Court recognized that immigration detention implicates a
liberty interest that "lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Due
Process] Clause protects,"293 notwithstanding the fact that the non-
citizen had already been ordered removed. Several years later, the
Court further recognized a liberty interest in the immigration
detention context for aliens who had not yet been legally
"admitted."2 94 Second, non-citizens who waive their rights via
stipulated orders of removal may also have a liberty interest in
avoiding incarceration in a prison or jail pursuant to a criminal
conviction under federal illegal re-entry statutes, particularly given
their draconian sentencing schemes.2 95
2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of Private Interests
The second Eldridge factor involves the risk that private interests
will be erroneously deprived under existing procedures and the
probable value, if any, of additional procedures. 2  In the stipulated
removal context, the primary error is that the government will deport
individuals who otherwise have claims to alternative forms of relief,
including voluntary departure, without informing them of the
290. Id. at 1039.
291. But see infra notes 317-21 and accompanying text (describing certain courts'
treatment of the ability to apply for relief from removal as purely discretionary).
292. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
293. Id. at 690.
294. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371,379 (2005).
295. See generally Keller, supra note 121 and accompanying text.
296. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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possibility of pursuing these other forms of relief.297 Given the nature
of deportation, the cost of error is especially high. The termination of
a property interest like social security benefits, which were at stake in
Eldridge, can eventually be corrected by restoring the benefits to the
individual.2" But the physical removal of a non-citizen often ends the
individual's ability to correct the error altogether due to the obstacles
to obtaining legal redress following physical removal.299
A component of the risk of erroneous deportations is the risk
that immigrants agreeing to stipulated orders of removal will be
subject to invalid waivers of their rights. Constitutionally protected
interests can be waived in various contexts. Although the
jurisprudence surrounding waivers of rights is far from coherent or
uniform," the standard inquiry involves determining whether an
individual made a considered and intelligent decision.3 01 Us are
required by regulation to find that a non-citizen's decision to opt for a
stipulated removal order was "voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent" 3"-the same standard that applies to waivers of rights
across the civil and criminal legal systems." Determining the
existence of an invalid waiver typically requires a case-by-case
297. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz-Lopez, 385 F.3d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (holding that defendant's due process rights were violated because the IJ failed to
inform him that he was eligible for voluntary departure instead of removal).
298. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 325-26. Of course, the temporary interruption of benefits can
invoke liberty interests. See Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970)
(acknowledging a liberty interest in uninterrupted receipt of benefits). I do not take the
position that terminating benefits does not implicate liberty interests, but simply make the
point that correcting the harms that accompany physical deportation is often far more
difficult than restoring governmental benefits.
299. These difficulties include the challenge of litigating one's case from abroad,
gaining physical re-entry after an erroneous deportation, and the continued operation of
the post-departure bar in some circuits. See Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Will Padilla Reach
Across the Border?, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 327,338-44 (2011).
300. See Jason Mazzone, Comment, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 801, 801
(2003) (comparing the doctrine of criminal waiver, in which courts generally allow
defendants to waive constitutional rights, with the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,
which views waivers of rights with greater skepticism).
301. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972) (finding a civil
judgment waiver subject to the same standard applicable to a waiver in a criminal
proceeding: "that it be voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made"); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 94 n.31 (1972) (finding that in both the civil and criminal arenas courts have a
reasonable presumption against waiver); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)
(using reasonable presumption against waiver in criminal context); Gete v. I.N.S., 121 F.3d
1285, 1293 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that principles governing waiver of constitutional rights
apply equally to criminal and civil cases).
302. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2012).
303. See supra note 301.
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analysis and a consideration of the nature of the right involved."* An
invalid waiver has been found, in particular, where the IJ failed to
adequately inform a non-citizen about his or her legal options,
including the existence of the right to counsel, the right to appeal, the
consequences of waiving such rights, and the availability of legal
alternatives.305 In light of the relevant legal standard, the risk of error
in the stipulated removal process arises both from (1) risks resulting
from the lack of in-person IJ review, and (2) risks resulting from non-
citizens' interactions with ICE agents, which immigration courts rely
on as a substitute for IJ review. The absence of counsel, language
barriers, and the complexity of the immigration laws compound the
information deficits that non-citizens face.
a. Absence of In-Person Review from Immigration Judge
Due process has been held to require that an IJ, before
determining that the non-citizen has validly waived the right to
counsel, first "inquire specifically as to whether petitioner wishes to
continue without a lawyer" and second, "receive a knowing and
voluntary affirmative response. "306 The courts have also recognized a
connection between the right to counsel and the ability to make a
considered and intelligent waiver of the right to appeal, given that
one's ability to decide whether to pursue appeal depends in large part
on the strength of one's legal claims." Indeed, the Board of
Immigration Appeals has recognized that, "in cases involving
unrepresented aliens, more detailed explanations" of the right to
appeal by IJs "are often needed.""s In the stipulated removal context,
the risk of a due process violation is particularly high. Ninety-six
304. See, e.g., Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (noting, in a criminal case, that whether valid
waiver exists "must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the
accused").
305. See, e.g., Gete, 121 F.3d at 1292-93 (finding no knowing waiver of right to judicial
review to challenge INS forfeiture of vehicles, where aliens were given the choice to seek
either judicial remedy or administrative remedy, but were not told that choosing the less
onerous administrative remedy would give up a right to judicial review).
306. Mendoza-Mazariegos v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1074,1080(9th Cir. 2007).
307. See Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding no valid waiver
of the right to appeal where a non-citizen was not provided with continuance necessary to
obtain counsel and "was under the misapprehension that he had no choice but to waive his
appeal").
308. In re Rodriguez-Diaz, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1320, 1323 (B.LA. 2000). Even where the
non-citizen was represented by counsel, the courts have found due process violations
where neither the lawyer nor the IJ specifically advised the non-citizen about the
consequences of waiving appeal. See Narine v. Holder, 559 F.3d 246, 249-50 (4th Cir.
2009).
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percent of non-citizens who opted for stipulated orders of removal
were not represented by counsel.3 09 And because an IJ signed off on
the removal order without holding an in-person hearing, they were
not asked if they wished to retain counsel. They therefore had little to
no access to accurate legal information needed in order to make
considered and intelligent waivers.
The elimination of the non-citizen's opportunity to appear before
the IJ makes it nearly impossible for Us to fulfill their duties to the
non-citizen, duties that are also aimed at preserving due process and
maintaining the integrity of the proceedings. To determine whether a
non-citizen's waiver of appeal was valid, courts have suggested that
an IJ must generally engage in an individualized colloquy with the
non-citizen to ensure that the non-citizen wishes to waive the right."'
Courts have found violations of due process where an IJ failed to
clarify the difference between waiving an appeal and agreeing that
the judge's order was the "final one."' Similar violations have also
been found where an IJ held a group deportation hearing and asked
respondents to stand if they wished to waive appeal. 12
IJs must also advise non-citizens of any apparent eligibility for
relief,313 which courts have held to include voluntary departure.3 14 As
the Second Circuit has explained, because "many aliens are
uncounselled, our removal system relies on IJs to explain the law
accurately to pro se aliens."" The Second Circuit went on to explain
that "[o]therwise, such aliens would have no way of knowing what
information was relevant to their cases and would be practically
foreclosed from making a case against removal."316 Under stipulated
removal, the IJ never advises the non-citizen as to his or her apparent
eligibility for relief from removal. To be sure, some circuits do not
309. See KOH, SRIKANTIAH & TUMLIN, supra note 42, at 1.
310. See United States v. Chavez-Huerto, 972 F.2d 1087, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1992)
(upholding waiver where one-on-one colloquy occurred between an I and a non-citizen);
United States v. Zaleta-Sosa, 854 F.2d 48, 49, 51-52 (5th Cir. 1988) (same); United States
v. Nicholas-Armenta, 763 F.2d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding waiver in mass
deportation hearing where judge conducted "particularized" inquiries).
311. Rodriguez-Diaz, 22 . & N. Dec. at 1321-22; see also United States v. Fares, 978
F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding U statement that "you're accepting orders of
deportation ... as final in your case with no appeal" insufficient to waive appellate rights).
312. United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d 751, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
313. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (2012).
314. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz-Lopez, 385 F.3d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (finding violation of due process when IJ failed to inform defendant of eligibility
for voluntary departure instead of removal).
315. United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61,71 (2d Cir. 2004).
316. Id.
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treat an IJ's failure to advise on eligibility for relief as a due process
violation, relying largely upon the principle that a grant of relief from
removal is purely discretionary and therefore not a right to which
non-citizens are entitled."' However, as one scholar has persuasively
argued, the refusal to treat inadequate or nonexistent advisals as
constitutional errors lies in a fundamental misunderstanding about
the nature of immigration relief."' As the Supreme Court emphasized
in INS v. St. Cyr,19 even if the right to ultimately receive relief from
removal is a matter of administrative discretion, the correct
application of rules governing eligibility does give rise to a cognizable
right.320 Moreover, the Ninth and the Second Circuits reject the other
courts' view, holding that the duty to inform a non-citizen whether he
or she appears to be eligible for relief, even discretionary forms of
relief, is required by due process.321 Given that the two circuits taking
the strongest view of the IJ's duty to advise a non-citizen of potential
eligibility for relief arguably have the most experience with, and the
317. The distinction between being advised of one's eligibility for relief versus being
granted relief has arisen most frequently in the context of litigation related to § 212(c)
relief, a form of immigration relief that existed prior to the 1996 laws. In 1996, Congress
repealed the availability of § 212(c) relief and rendered any non-citizen with a conviction
classified as an "aggravated felony" ineligible for cancellation of removal, the form of
discretionary relief that replaced § 212(c). See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009-594, 3009-618
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2006)); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289, 297 (2001) (discussing the repeal of § 212(c)). In 2001, after five years of litigation
over the retroactive application of the repeal of § 212(c) relief, the Supreme Court ruled
that § 212(c) relief would remain available for persons with pre-1996 convictions who
would have been eligible for § 212(c) but for the 1996 laws. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326.
Following the St. Cyr ruling, non-citizens who had been deported based on the erroneous
advice that their convictions made them ineligible for § 212(c), and then criminally
prosecuted for illegal re-entry, sought to collaterally attack their original removal orders
on the grounds that they should have been given the opportunity to apply for § 212(c)
relief. For more detailed treatment, see Brent S. Wible, The Strange Afterlife of Section
212(c) Relief Collateral Attacks on Deportation Orders in Prosecutions for filegal Reentry
After St. Cyr, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 455, 457-66 (2005). In some jurisdictions, the federal
courts rejected their claims, taking the position that the grant of § 212(c) relief is a purely
discretionary decision that does not give rise to a cognizable right. See id. at 466-74
(discussing circuit court opinions).
318. See Wible, supra note 317, at 485-86.
319. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
320. Id. at 307 ("Traditionally, courts recognized a distinction between eligibility for
discretionary relief on the one hand, and the favorable exercise of discretion, on the other
hand.").
321. See United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Wible, supra note 317, at
473-80 (discussing reasoning of Second and Ninth Circuits).
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strongest expertise in, immigration matters,322 their view should be
treated as the majority one.
Worse yet, ICE has, by its own admission, engaged in and relied
on blatant judge-shopping in order to achieve high numbers of
stipulated orders of removal in some parts of the country. By
identifying specific IJs who are willing to sign stipulated removal
orders without holding in-person hearings to assess the validity of the
non-citizen's waiver, and then routing all requests for stipulated
orders to those specific judges, 2 the administrative agency has
explicitly manipulated the judicial process in a way that violates the
fundamental fairness of the proceedings under almost any standard.
The egregiousness of ICE's procedural manipulation is even more
pronounced given the legitimacy problems currently facing
immigration courts. A well-known study has demonstrated that the
single most influential factor affecting the success of an immigrant's
case is the identity of the IJ to whom the case is assigned.3 2 4 Concerns
about the influence of political hires in the U selection process during
the Bush Administration have also arguably undermined public
confidence in immigration courts.3 5 The practice also throws into
question the quality of the paper-only review that IJs do conduct.
Given that only twenty IJs signed over 100,000 of the 160,000
stipulated removals entered through mid-2010, it is likely that those
judges' review of the files was brief and cursory.
322. The Ninth and Second Circuit both hear a greater number of immigration
petitions than any other circuit in the country, and immigration petitions constitute a
higher percentage of the courts' overall docket in comparison to other circuits. See LAW,
supra note 240, at 154 (showing Ninth Circuit as having fifty-four percent of nation's
immigration appeals in 2005 and discussing the disproportionate volume of cases in Ninth
and Second Circuits); Lenni B. Benson, The Search for Fair Agency Process: The
Immigration Opinions ofJudge Michael Daly Hawkins 1994 to 2010, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 7, 10
(2011) (noting that immigration petitions represented twenty-seven percent of the Ninth
Circuit's docket in 2009); John R.B. Palmer, The Second Circuit's "New Asylum Seekers":
Responses to an Expanded Immigration Docket, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 965, 968-70 (2006)
(noting that petitions for review from BIA then constituted thirty-six percent of the
Second Circuit's docket).
323. See supra discussion accompanying notes 236-41.
324. See Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 24, at 363-64.
325. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF
POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE
Arr'Y GEN. (2008) (J 37.2:P 75), http://www.justice.gov/oig/specialls0807/final.pdf
(concluding, inter alia, that three individuals in the OAG inappropriately considered
political and ideological affiliation in hiring Us); Legomsky, supra note 25 (arguing that
the Attorney General's threats to reassign or remove Is if they ruled against the
government in immigration proceedings played a substantial role in eliminating decisional
independence).
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By signing a stipulated removal order without an in-person
hearing, the IJ thus relies on the non-citizen's interaction with front-
line ICE agents instead of engaging in a substantive exchange with
the non-citizen. An analysis of these interactions suggests, however,
that the risk of error is unacceptably high.
b. Quality of ICE Agent Interaction with Non-Citizens
Selected for Stipulated Removal.
Another factor that raises the risk of error is that non-citizens
sign stipulations based solely on information they receive from ICE.
As noted, informal scripts used by government agents to describe the
stipulated order of removal process reveal blatant misinformation and
misrepresentations about the immigration laws. Given the disparity
between the interests of ICE agents and non-citizens, it seems likely
that ICE agents do not generally provide immigrant detainees with
comprehensive and accurate information about their legal options to
fight removal. Even outside the stipulated removal setting, for
instance with voluntary departure grants, ICE has been known to
engage in a pattern and practice of coercing non-citizens into
accepting physical removal. 26 In the stipulated removal context, the
absence of any oversight, policy, or rule affecting ICE agents during
the solicitation process makes the entire process particularly
vulnerable to error.
The potential for error created by language barriers in the
stipulated removal process is significant. Although the stipulated
removal forms published by EOIR in 2010 contain a Spanish
language translation, the governing immigration regulations contain
no requirement that ICE officers who offer stipulated removal orders
speak other languages fluently or even intelligibly. Unlike
immigration court proceedings, in which statements made by and to a
limited English proficient non-citizen must be interpreted through an
official court interpreter,3 27 ICE agents' communications with non-
English speaking detainees are not subject to explicit regulation. In
many cases, the quality of communication may depend on whatever
326. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 551, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1990)
(affirming a permanent injunction entered after finding that then-INS and Border Patrol
agents engaged in a practice and pattern of coercing Salvadoran nationals into accepting
voluntary departure).
327. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.22 (2012). The policy of providing only partial interpretation
in immigration court, as opposed to interpretation of the entire proceeding, carries
problems as well. See Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across
Language Difference, 54 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1027 (2007).
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Spanish-language trainings are conducted by the Agency, if those
trainings occur at all. 328  Nonetheless, these same officers'
conversations are relied on by IJs to determine the validity of the
waiver.
The complexity of the immigration laws compound the problems
raised by the absence of counsel and IJ review. For those who face
purely civil grounds of removal and therefore presumably do not have
a disqualifying criminal conviction,2 9 voluntary departure may
present a superior alternative to opting for a stipulated order of
removal. Indeed, district courts have found due process violations in
illegal re-entry appeals where Us signed stipulated removal forms
while neglecting to advise the detainee of his eligibility for voluntary
departure," and appeals courts have held the same outside of the
stipulated removal context.33' However, as noted, ICE agents have
thus far failed even to inform many immigrant detainees about the
option of voluntary departure or the relatively harsher consequences
of receiving a stipulated removal order in comparison to a grant of
voluntary departure.332
One might also take the position that non-citizens facing removal
for criminal convictions, particularly those with convictions classified
as "aggravated felonies," should be specifically targeted for stipulated
328. ICE reportedly "eliminate[d] formal language training requirements for new ICE
agents in 2003," and it is not clear whether the Agency has restored those requirements.
See DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE HOMELAND SEC. COMM. FOR U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, DECISION ELIMINATING SPANISH AND OTHER LANGUAGE
TRAINING FOR ICE INVESTIGATORS WAS A MISTAKE 2 (2005),
http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20060912174546-40413.pdf.
329. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (2006) (permitting voluntary departure in lieu of, or
prior to, completion of removal proceedings, if alien not deportable under INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) (conviction for aggravated felony) or INA § 237(a)(4)(B) (terrorist
activities)).
330. See United States v. Penaloza-Mejia, No. CR-10-2116-EFS, 2011 WL 293877, at
*3 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 27, 2011); United States v. Soto-Castelo, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1071
(D. Nev. 2008), affd, 361 Fed. App'x 782 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Gomez-
Hernandez, No. CR-08-6005-FVS, 2008 WL 2096876, at *5 (E.D. Wash. May 16,2008).
331. See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-Castro, 671 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2012)
(finding invalid waiver of appeal where an IJ told respondent, in a group deportation
hearing, that he was eligible for voluntary departure, but then stated that the IJ would
never grant voluntary departure to respondent); United States v. Ortiz-Lopez, 385 F.3d
1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding violation of due process rights where an IJ failed to
inform defendant of eligibility for voluntary departure instead of removal); United States
v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that failure to inform
respondent of his right to contact Mexican consul prejudiced him because he could have
applied for voluntary departure rather than deportation).
332. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 206 (describing a script used by ICE agents
to explain stipulated removal, which failed to mention voluntary departure as a potential
option).
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removal.33 3 Indeed, an aggravated felony conviction renders an
individual ineligible for most forms of immigration relief, including
voluntary departure." What about those non-citizens who face
removal for criminal convictions and might therefore be ineligible
even for voluntary departure? Would it be better to instead
concentrate the use of stipulated removal on non-citizens whose
criminal convictions lead to an immigration penalty? The problem
here also implicates the complexity of the immigration laws.
Determining whether a particular conviction actually falls under one
of the INA's many categories of removable crimes can involve a
lengthy, complicated analysis that typically requires the intervention
of a lawyer.335 Given the actual sophistication required to decipher
the impact of a particular criminal conviction on an individual's
eligibility for relief, ICE agents' statements indicating that "any"
conviction for "assault or battery" will render an immigrant ineligible
for relief or release on bond is simply incorrect as a matter of law33 6
and might constitute reversible error if conveyed by an IJ or
immigration lawyer.3
The nature of the role of the DHS trial attorney-the only
attorney who participates in the approval of a stipulated removal
order-further enhances the potential risk of error. Because DHS
333. A draft report of the Administrative Conference of the United States on
immigration adjudication has recommended concentrating the use of stipulated removal
on non-citizens with prior convictions, including pro se detainees. See LENNI B. BENSON &
RUSSELL R. WHEELER, INTERIM DRAFr ENHANCING QUALITY AND TIMELINESS IN
IMMIGRATION REMOVAL ADJUDICATION 49 (2012), http://www.acus.gov/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2012/01/ACUS-Immigration-Removal-Adjudication-Draft-
Report-1-12_12.pdf. The authors of the report later modified the recommendation in
response to comments highlighting the due process problems associated with stipulated
removal. The final version of the report retained the recommendation to concentrate
stipulated removal on non-citizens with serious criminal convictions but not on pro se
detainees. See BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 18, at 81.
334. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(C) (2006) (establishing as a prerequisite to voluntary
departure an IJ's finding that the alien is not deportable under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as
convicted of an aggravated felony).
335. See Koh, supra note 63, at 23-39.
336. In a number of cases, the BIA has held that simple assault and/or battery are not
categorically crimes involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., In re Sejas, 24 I. & N. Dec. 236,
238 (B.I.A. 2007) (assault and battery under Virginia law); In re Sanudo, 23 1. & N. Dec.
968, 973 (B.I.A. 2006) (domestic battery under California law). Many simple assault and
battery statutes carry maximum sentences that are less than one year, placing them outside
of the ambit of the aggravated felony category. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2006).
337. See, e.g., United States v. Penaloza-Mejia, No. CR-1(--2116-EFS, 2011 WL
293877, at *5-6 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 27, 2011) (finding, under categorical and modified
categorical analysis of prior conviction, that conviction did not constitute an "aggravated
felony" for immigration law purposes and would not have disqualified from voluntary
departure a non-citizen who agreed to stipulated removal).
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attorneys are not required to screen non-citizens who are eligible for
relief from removal or whose charges of removability do not meet the
relevant burden of proof, their cursory review of the file contributes
to the illusion of due process without providing an adequate
safeguard. Indeed, given the caseloads of trial attorneys, who have
been reported to have only twenty minutes to prepare an entire case
before a final merits hearing," it is unrealistic to believe that trial
attorney review of requests for stipulated orders of removal offers
substantive value. DHS attorneys also operate within a courtroom
culture marked by a severe absence of stipulations and discussions
with respondents, even those with counsel, to settle on an outcome
that reflects an arms' length negotiation between both parties.3 9 As a
result, DHS attorneys would likely not question the practice of
signing off on a "stipulation" in which they have never communicated
directly with the respondent or with counsel. While DHS attorneys do
not owe specific duties to the non-citizen, they are nonetheless
responsible for upholding the Constitution and maintaining the
integrity of the removal and enforcement process and should
therefore refrain from concurring in the stipulated removal process,
given its defects.340
One problem with assessing the risk of error inherent in the
stipulated removal process, however, is that it is difficult to know with
precision how many immigrants who are deported via stipulated
removal might have ultimately either been eligible for, or received,
relief. To be sure, the immigration laws have been rightly criticized as
harsh. Many individuals, even those with longstanding ties to the
United States or who otherwise make positive contributions to the
country, are simply not eligible to fight the charge of deportation. For
those who do not qualify for any immigration relief or who cannot
contest removability, receiving a stipulated removal order may truly
represent the best option. However, EOIR's own statistics suggest
that a significant number-forty-five percent, or almost half-of non-
citizens who pursue their cases before an IJ ultimately receive an
outcome better than a formal removal order, meaning that they
receive some form of relief from removal (including voluntary
338. See APPLESEED & CHICAGO APPLESEED, supra note 27, at 16 (discussing
caseloads of DHS trial attorneys).
339. See supra discussion accompanying notes 104-06 (discussing the absence of a
culture of stipulation in immigration courts).
340. See Reid v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 949 F.2d 287, 288 (9th Cir.
1991) ("Counsel for the government has an interest only in the law being observed, not in
victory or defeat in any particular litigation.").
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departure) or termination of the case.34 ' Admittedly, immigrants who
opt for stipulated removal may arguably have weaker claims to relief
or termination as a group, so that the numbers alone may not suggest
an error rate of, say, forty-five percent. Nonetheless, the meaningful
number of immigrants who ultimately receive alternatives to formal
removal, in combination with the severe risk of error inherent in the
procedures used during stipulated removal, together lend credence to
the claim that the risk of error is constitutionally unacceptable.
3. Government Interests
The third Eldridge factor involves the interest of the government
in the conservation of fiscal and administrative resources. As
discussed, the fiscal and administrative burdens facing immigration
adjudication are formidable. 34 3 At first glance, stipulated orders of
removal may seem to offer a compelling way to alleviate some of the
burdens on IJs to meet case completion deadlines. They may also
appear to provide a simple solution to a perceived lack of detention
bed space, as well as further the interest of both the non-citizen and
government in reducing the average length of time that immigrant
detainees spend in federal custody prior to removal. According to one
estimate, stipulated removal orders might have provided an estimated
cost savings of $100 million in fiscal year 2010.1'
However, a narrow focus on fiscal costs risks an incomplete due
process analysis. The Eldridge Court recognized that the
government's efficiency interests, while relevant, should not be given
undue consideration, and emphasized that the "ultimate balance"
should focus on "when, under our constitutional system, judicial-type
procedures must be imposed upon administrative action to assure
fairness." 34 5 In the immigration context, the federal courts have
weighed the limitations of due process against the practical realities of
overburdened immigration courts before. One court has noted, for
instance, that "we cannot allow a 'myopic insistence upon
341. See EOIR, FY 2011 YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at D2, Q1 (showing 11.6% of
cases resulting in termination, 14.4% in a grant of relief other than voluntary departure,
and 19% in voluntary departure). Because voluntary departure can be granted either by
an IJ or by ICE, these numbers do not reflect the total numbers of non-citizens who were
initially charged with removal but to whom the immigration agency ultimately decided to
offer voluntary departure in lieu of continuing with removal proceedings.
342. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
343. See supra Part .B.
344. See Letter from Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n to Charles K. Edwards, Acting
Inspector Gen. 5 n.23 (Aug. 2011) (on file with author).
345. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 348.
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expeditiousness' to render the right to counsel 'an empty
formality.' "346 The government has a strong interest in the accurate
and lawful adjudication of removal cases.3 47 The government also has
a broader investment in principles that have long animated the
immigration laws, such as family unity, economic growth, and
humanitarian concerns. Indeed, the cost of broken families and loss of
faith in the integrity of the legal system are harder to quantify but
potentially far more significant and worth avoiding.
However, ICE's standard efficiency-based argument in favor of
stipulated orders of removal-that they offer an effective cost-saving
measure by reducing case calendaring time or the cost of detention-
obscures the true costs of stipulated removal. The argument focuses
only on fiscal efficiencies that occur at the front end of the process,
but it ignores the various ways in which constitutional errors are
expensive. Failure to reform the stipulated removal process is likely
to lead to further litigation across both the civil and criminal systems.
Indeed, stipulated removal may constitute only the first step in a
multi-stage chain of enforcement that could include the civil
reinstatement of the prior stipulated removal order by ICE, as well as
an illegal re-entry prosecution in the criminal system. But continuing
to employ a flawed procedure at the front end of the enforcement
chain is likely to exacerbate costs at the back end, through the cost of
federal criminal appeals and their attendant consumption of resources
for the judiciary and prosecutors' and public defenders' offices. From
ICE's and EOIR's perspective, shifting costs from the immigration
adjudication and enforcement system to the federal criminal justice
system may not be problematic; however, an appropriate due process
analysis should take into account the full range of costs created by the
system.
Once the costs of the current stipulated removal procedure are
exposed, it becomes clear that the alternatives are far less costly.
Indeed, some alternatives to the implementation of stipulated orders
of removal may continue to offer fiscal and administrative benefits to
the government. These alternatives are discussed in the following
Section.
346. Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite,
376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)); see also Mendoza-Mazariegos v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1074, 1084
(9th Cir. 2007) ("As frustrating as delays might be, an immigrant's right to counsel should
not be sacrificed because of the shortcomings of the immigration system itself.").
347. For a discussion of the phenomenon of the government wrongfully deporting
individuals whom it did not have legal authority to deport, see generally Rosenbloom,
supra note 156.
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V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the problems with the current implementation of
stipulated removal, if reformed, the program could constitute a tool
that addresses some of the problems in immigration adjudication
while properly balancing due process concerns. If stipulated removal
remains available to those non-citizens for whom it presents the best
option or who genuinely wish to return to their country, then it can
fulfill its original vision of offering meaningful benefits to both sides.
Stipulated removal could be implemented in a manner that accounts
for some of the due process concerns raised in this Article, without
requiring intervention from Congress." This Part discusses those
potential solutions. Ultimately, many of the problems associated with
stipulated removal can be traced back to the immigration
adjudication crisis itself, such as the categorical absence of a right to
counsel, the use of detention in removal proceedings, and the
operation of the immigration courts. Others have proposed
comprehensive solutions to the challenges of immigration
adjudication, such as by fundamentally restructuring the immigration
court system.349 This Part takes a more focused (and admittedly
limited) approach, and explores how the government might approach
stipulated removal in the absence of either legislative or other large-
scale reform.
348. The Obama Administration has looked to solutions that do not require legislative
action, and scholars have begun to probe the implications of the executive role in setting
immigration policy. The most prominent of the Administration's actions has been the
extension of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, in which DHS announced that it
would extend temporary safety from removal along with work authorization to certain
youths who had come to the United States as children and meet other eligibility
requirements. See generally JANET NAPOLITANO, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION WITH RESPECT TO INDIVIDUALS WHO CAME
TO THE UNITED STATES AS CHILDREN (2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-
exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf (advising
DHS on enforcement of immigration laws against "certain young people who were
brought to this country as children and know only this country as home"). For a discussion
of the history, modern use of, and possibilities associated with the President's exercise of
immigration powers, see generally Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President
and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009).
349. See Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 35, at 1686-87
(proposing creation of Article III immigration court); Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz &
Schrag supra note 24, at 386 (proposing creation of Article I immigration court).
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A. Opportunity for Immigration Court Hearing or Attorney
Consultation Before Issuance of Stipulated Removal Order
One of the fundamental problems with the stipulated order of
removal process is the unrepresented non-citizen's disproportionate
reliance on the statements of an ICE agent who offers the stipulated
order itself, in combination with the boilerplate form prepared by the
Agency. To account for the misinformation and pressure likely to
develop in this setting, ICE and EOIR should limit the use of
stipulated orders of removal on pro se immigrant detainees to those
who either (a) appear in person for an IJ hearing after the non-citizen
has agreed to the removal order but before the judge signs, or (b)
have had a meaningful opportunity to consult with an attorney who
does not owe any duties to the government. These reforms, which are
best suited for regulatory amendment, would seek to displace some of
the power that frontline ICE agents currently have over the non-
citizen.
Requiring an immigration court hearing after the non-citizen
signs the stipulated order request but before the judge signs the final
order of removal would mirror the procedures currently used in
criminal court to ascertain the validity of a criminal defendant's guilty
plea.as0 Through the use of a brief, in-person colloquy, akin to those
required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, IJs
could engage in an independent determination of whether the non-
citizen's waiver of rights was "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent" as
required by the federal regulation."s' At the hearing, the IJ could ask
the non-citizen whether they understood what they were signing
when they agreed to the stipulated removal order and whether they
experienced pressure or coercion with the ICE agent who offered the
order to them. The IJ should affirmatively explain to the non-citizen
the rights that she is waiving. The IJ would also have an opportunity
to fulfill his or her duties to the non-citizen, such as advising the non-
citizen of any apparent eligibility for relief. In contrast to the practice
in some jurisdictions, all requests for stipulated orders of removal-
like any other matter-should be randomly assigned to all IJs within a
particular court, not routed only to those judges who are willing to
sign the orders.
As an alternative to requiring in-person hearings before IJs,
EOIR could require that unrepresented non-citizens submit proof
that they individually consulted with an attorney who advised them of
350. See FED.R. CRIM.P. 11(b).
351. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2012).
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their eligibility for immigration relief and the consequences of signing
a stipulated removal order before judges sign off on stipulated
removal orders. While the attorneys need not commit to full
representation of the non-citizen in the removal matter, attorneys
affiliated with a Legal Orientation Program (LOP) could submit a
short declaration attesting that they discussed the non-citizen's legal
options with the detainee and, if relevant, that the detainee attended
a group presentation prepared by the LOP provider. ICE and EOIR
might also recruit pro bono lawyers from the immigration bar to assist
with the individual consultation process. Important limitations on this
proposal exist, given the relative unavailability of LOPs. Nonetheless,
where LOPs exist, stipulated orders of removal might be structured in
collaboration with LOP providers.
Two primary objections to this proposal may arise, from opposite
ends of the ideological spectrum. The first objection might focus on
cost and come from the government or those who believe that
maximizing efficiency and minimizing costs toward the objective of
deporting non-citizens who have violated the immigration laws should
generally outweigh concern for due process rights. To be sure,
requiring either an immigration court hearing or an individual
consultation with a lawyer would involve some additional cost,
principally in the form of additional immigration court time or
detention, or government resources required for individual attorney
consultations. However, costs alone fail to serve as a sufficient
justification for failure to comply with constitutional requirements3 11
As noted earlier, the costs associated with a dysfunctional stipulated
removal system may well outweigh the immediate costs associated
with providing hearings and/or counsel."'
A second objection could come from the perspective of those
who possess a philosophical commitment to fairness in removal
proceedings but view the promise of additional procedures with
cynicism. Do more hearings or attorney consultations offer a true
solution, particularly given the complexity of the immigration laws,
shortcomings of immigration adjudication and complaints about the
quality of the immigration bar? Or will it simply replace one pro
forma procedure with another? Indeed, one might point to the
criminal justice system-where constitutional rights attach with full
force-and argue persuasively that despite the existence of Rule 11
352. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
353. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing costs of stipulated removal as
currently implemented).
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and its state law counterparts, criminal defendants routinely plead
guilty to crimes that they did not commit, without fully understanding
the implications of a guilty plea.354 Indeed, criminal law scholars have
powerfully documented the disconnect between the rights guaranteed
by constitutional criminal procedure and the practical reality of the
criminal justice system."' Another argument would be that creating
more rights grounded primarily in procedure will have the
unintended consequence of preventing the enactment of greater
substantive rights. 356
However, requiring more process, rather than less, is nonetheless
a step that would constitute a meaningful improvement to the current
process. The idea of limiting the use of stipulated removal orders to
non-citizens who are represented by counsel, and encouraging IJs to
assess the validity of the waiver, has been discussed by others, such as
the independent government agency the Administrative Conference
of the United States. Other advantages might attach for non-
citizens. Colloquies between Us and non-citizens would be recorded,
thereby allowing for appellate review and discussion of the merits of
the process, instead of allowing stipulated removal to remain
shrouded in relative secrecy and conducted in the back halls of
immigration detention facilities. Us who have embraced stipulated
removal orders in their current form may well approach such hearings
with indignation; however, appellate review would remain available
as a response to potential resistance from IJs to holding hearings.
354. One might look no further than the poor quality of Rule 11 colloquies in federal
immigration enforcement prosecutions for evidence of the potential for deficiencies and
shortcuts. See generally Lydgate, supra note 34 (describing the implementation of
"Operation Streamline" in four border cities and discussing its legal and policy
implications); see also Maximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and
Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L.
223, 276-77 (2006) (questioning the value of plea colloquy in ensuring voluntariness of
guilty plea due to judge's limited access to information).
355. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REv. 505, 536-37 (2001).
356. See Benson, supra note 164, at 1487.
357. See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
RECOMMENDATION 2012-3, IMMIGRATION REMOVAL ADJUDICATION 7-8 (2012),
http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/06/Final-Recommendation-2012-
3-Immigration-Removal-Adjudication.pdf (encouraging EOIR to engage in pilot tests in
which random samples of respondents, having been counseled by independent attorneys,
appear for in-person hearings in order to evaluate validity of waivers); see also About,
ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., http://www.acus.gov/about/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2012)
(describing the Administrative Conference of the United States ("ACUS") as "an
independent federal agency dedicated to improving the administrative process through
consensus-driven applied research, providing nonpartisan expert advice and
recommendations for improvement of federal agency procedures").
542 [Vol. 91
STIPULATED ORDERS OF REMOVAL
B. Regulate ICE Agents' Interactions with Detainees During
Solicitation Phase
The stipulated removal statute and regulations are completely
silent with respect to how ICE agents conduct the "solicitation phase"
of the stipulated removal process, thereby creating a procedural void
which ICE agents have filled with their own scripts, procedures, and
practices. As illustrated by the Spanish-language scripts that have
organically developed in ICE offices without meaningful oversight,
the current procedures appear to be woefully inadequate from a due
process perspective."' In other removal contexts, federal regulations
prescribe small but important limitations on ICE officer behavior. For
instance, the regulations governing administrative removal-a form
of removal in which ICE officers directly process removal orders for
non-LPRs with aggravated felony convictions)-contain limited, but
available, procedural safeguards. Those regulations require that the
administrative removal process be handled by two different officers-
an issuing officer (who brings the charges) and a deciding officer
(who evaluates the evidence of removability against the non-
citizen).359 Under the administrative removal regulation, the officers
must provide the non-citizen with notice of the charges against her3 0
and sufficient time to rebut the written charges36' and, under some
circumstances, must refer the case to an IJ if the evidence against the
non-citizen is insufficient. 362 The stipulated removal regulation, by
contrast, contains no such limitations on ICE agent behavior.
DHS should promulgate regulations that specifically require ICE
officers to provide non-citizens selected for stipulated orders of
removal with formal notice of the charges against them and an
opportunity to examine the charges. The regulations should also
provide guidance to facilitate ICE officers' compliance with this
Article's recommendation to limit stipulated orders of removal to
situations where a non-citizen appears for an immigration court
hearing or consults individually with an attorney. For instance, the
regulations might impose a waiting period between the time the non-
citizen agrees to the stipulated removal order and the time an IJ
actually signs it to ensure that the non-citizen has an opportunity to
consult with an attorney.
358. See sources cited supra notes 197-210 and accompanying text.
359. 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(a) (2012) (defining "deciding service officer" and "issuing service
officer" and stating that the two officers must be different people).
360. Id. § 238.1(b)(2)(i).
361. Id. § 238.1(c).
362. See id. § 238.1 (d)(iii).
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In addition to formal regulations, DHS could issue subregulatory
guidance and training to ICE officers to safeguard the procedural
integrity of stipulated removal orders. The guidance could set forth
guidelines aimed at reducing the likelihood that ICE officers will
pressure detainees into signing stipulated orders of removal. For
instance, to prevent ICE officers from blatantly misstating the law or
legal options available to detainees, DHS could develop guidelines
that reflect the substantive legal information that ICE officers must
convey, or require any scripts used by ICE officers to be approved at
the supervisory level. To be sure, the value of scripts or internal
requirements is limited, and the risk that ICE officers will fail to
follow internal protocol exists. Indeed, in the expedited removal
context, Customs and Border Patrol officers have failed miserably in
terms of compliance with mandatory questions or required advisals
for asylum-seekers at the border-even when those officers knew
they were being evaluated by outside observers. 63 Despite this
reality, more robust internal rules may set the stage for greater
oversight of the program, as well as for litigation-based challenges to
the implementation of stipulated removal.
C. Presumption of Constitutional Invalidity for Prior Stipulated
Removal Orders
Stipulated removal's structural deficiencies should also give rise
to a presumption that stipulated removal orders entered to date
against unrepresented immigrants, under the practices described in
this Article, are constitutionally invalid. A presumption of
constitutional invalidity would primarily affect three federal entities:
United States Attorneys' offices prosecuting immigration violations,
immigration adjudicators (primarily Us and the BIA), and the federal
judiciary.
First, federal criminal prosecutors should, like the United States
Attorney's Office in the Southern District of California, refrain from
seeking illegal re-entry prosecutions where the underlying removal
order was a stipulated order.' Non-citizens who re-enter after having
previously received a stipulated removal order would still remain
criminally liable for misdemeanor illegal entry but would avoid the
harsh sentencing scheme that accompanies illegal re-entry. Federal
363. See Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 136, at 178 ("Despite their mandatory nature,
every study of the expedited removal process and the mandatory questions shows that
secondary inspectors repeatedly fail to ask, or fail to record the answer to, one or more of
the questions.").
364. See supra text accompanying notes 269-70.
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prosecutors should also refrain from seeking sentencing
enhancements in illegal entry cases where the enhancement is based
on the existence of a stipulated removal order.6 s These exercises of
criminal prosecutorial discretion would ameliorate some of the sting
that stipulated removal orders have thus far inflicted.
Second, the administrative Agency adjudicators-namely, IJs
and the BIA-should apply the presumption of constitutional
invalidity in civil immigration cases involving stipulated orders of
removal. The presumption would appear most frequently in motions
to reopen before either trial- or appellate-level Agency adjudicators,
in which an immigrant might allege that her waiver of rights was
invalid and seek to assert relief to which she is eligible. Under current
law, an immigrant who claims that a written waiver was obtained
invalidly generally has the burden of proving otherwise.366 Such a
presumption would shift the burden of proof to the Agency to show,
for instance, that the waiver of rights was knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent.
Third, the federal judiciary should apply a presumption of
constitutional invalidity to stipulated orders of removal in both
immigration and criminal appeals. This recommendation would most
significantly affect collateral attacks in illegal re-entry prosecutions.
In immigration matters, federal appeals courts hearing petitions for
review may have the opportunity to apply the presumption as well,
such as in appeals of motions to reopen before the Agency where a
stipulated removal order was entered. 367 The presumption might also
365. United States v. Rodriguez-Ocampo, 664 F.3d 1275, 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 2011)
(finding that sentencing enhancement where "the defendant previously was deported, or
unlawfully remained in the United States, after ... a conviction for a felony that is ... a
crime of violence" cannot apply where prior order was a stipulated removal order).
366. See Richardson v. United States, 558 F.3d 216, 219-23 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing
and approving "the presumption that, when there is a written waiver, the waiver is valid,
thereby implicitly placing the burden on the alien of proving any claim that the waiver was
invalid").
367. A vila-Santoyo v. Holder serves as an example of a case in which a court of appeals
could have applied a presumption of unconstitutionality to stipulated orders of removal.
Mr. Avila-Santoyo had appealed the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen a stipulated
removal order, despite the fact that he had resided in the U.S. since the age of two, was
statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal, and was a juvenile when he signed the
stipulated order. The argument that systemic flaws in the stipulated removal process made
deprivations of due process highly likely was made available to the court, see Brief for
Nat'l Immigration Law Ctr. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Avila-Santoyo v.
Holder, No. 11-14941, 2012 WL 3530679, at *10--22 (11th Cir. Aug. 16, 2012) (unfiled
brief) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); however, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the appeal on other grounds without addressing the constitutionality of the
underlying stipulated removal order or accepting the brief for filing. Avila-Santoyo, 2012
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apply to cases in which the federal courts' ability to assert jurisdiction
over a petition for review depends on whether the non-citizen
exhausted his or her administrative remedies but failed to do so based
upon the reasonable perception that the stipulated removal order
waived their right to appeal to the BIA.*
D. Greater Use of Alternatives to Detention (ATDs) and Voluntary
Departure In Lieu of Stipulated Removal Orders
The government's logic regarding the need for stipulated orders
of removal-that the need to alleviate the pressure of limited
detention bed space and overcrowded court calendars make them
necessary-is shortsighted. It overlooks the fact that the perceived
lack of immigration detention space and, to a lesser degree,
backlogged courts are themselves creations of the Agency. More
extensive use of Alternatives to Detention ("ATDs"), in which ICE
physically releases detainees upon the condition of participation in
community-based monitoring programs, could ameliorate the lack of
detention bed space. 6 ' While ICE has voiced a strong interest in
making greater use of ATDs, particularly since President Obama
took office," it has generally focused its efforts on more punitive
forms of ATDs, such as ankle monitoring bracelets."' However,
viable options, involving releasing immigrants while requiring them to
report to community organizations, churches, or other partnering
entities, have been attempted and should be explored in further
WL 3530679, at *1, *3 (No. 11-14941) (per curiam). The author of this Article assisted in
preparing the amicus brief for filing.
368. See, e.g., Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 659 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding
that the court lacked jurisdiction to review stipulated removal order where alien failed to
appeal within thirty-day deadline for filing petition for review under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(1)). The author of this Article worked on an amicus brief to the BIA seeking
administrative reopening of the respondent's stipulated removal order. See Brief of
Amicus Curiae National Immigration Law Center in Support of Respondent at 14,
Cordova-Soto, No. A091 045 891 (B.I.A. Sept. 4, 2012).
369. See DETENTION WATCH NETWORK & STANFORD LAW SCHOOL IMMIGRANTS'
RIGHTS CLINIC, POLICY BRIEF: COMMUNITY-BASED ALTERNATIVES TO IMMIGRATION
DETENTION 1-2 (2010), http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites
/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/DWN%20ATD%2OReport%20FINAL08-25-2010.pdf.
For a critique of ATD programs, see generally RUTGERS SCHOOL OF LAW-NEWARK
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC, FREED BUT NOT FREE: A REPORT EXAMINING THE
CURRENT USE OF ALTERNATIVES TO IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2012),
http://www.law.newark.rutgers.edu/files/FreedbutnotFree.pdf.
370. See SCHRIRO, supra note 28, at 20-21.
371. See DET. WATCH NETWORK & STANFORD LAW SCH. IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS
CLINIC, supra note 369, at 7 ("ICE's current programs rely heavily on onerous restrictions
including telephonic reporting, curfews, and Global Positioning System (GPS)-enabled
electronic monitoring via ankle devices.").
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detail. 72 The use of ATDs would also further non-citizens' interest in
avoiding prolonged physical detention pending removal.
Similarly, ICE has the discretion to offer voluntary departure to
most non-citizens, aside from those facing removal for aggravated
felony convictions or terrorist activities, in lieu of or before the
completion of removal proceedings." ICE should screen cases to
determine whether it should offer voluntary departure to all
detainees who might have been previously offered stipulated orders
of removal, instead of vice versa. To be sure, the voluntary departure
process itself carries the potential for abuse and coercion.374 However,
instead of opting for stipulated removal and its many defects, ICE
should reconsider its use of voluntary departure, which has decreased
drastically in the past decade in favor of formal removals.'
E. Enhance Agency Transparency
Finally, ICE and EOIR should disclose more information to the
public regarding the use of stipulated orders of removal. For instance,
both agencies should include statistics on the number of stipulated
orders of removal entered in regular publications such as the EOIR
Yearbook and DHS reports on enforcement actions. At the local
level, EOIR and ICE offices could release to the immigration bar,
especially nonprofit providers, information regarding their plans to
use stipulated removal, so know-your-rights materials and other
education campaigns could incorporate information on stipulated
orders of removal for specific immigrant communities.
CONCLUSION
While the government has looked to stipulated orders of removal
as a partial solution to the immigration adjudication crisis, the
implementation of the stipulated removal over the past decades
shows that the due process costs exacted by the program have
outweighed any efficiency benefits associated with it. As
implemented, stipulated removal violates procedural due process as
well as the Agency's own regulations. Some of these deficiencies can
be cured through administrative corrections. However, the problems
presented by stipulated removal can also be traced to ICE's culture,
372. See id. at 8-12.
373. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (2006).
374. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 551, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1990).
375. See DHS, 2010 YEARBOOK, supra note 29, at 94 (showing steady decrease in use
of voluntary departure).
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which suffers from a deep-seated pro-enforcement orientation. This
culture in turn facilitates the problematic practices that are reflected
in stipulated removal, such as blatant judge-shopping or
misstatements about the law.
Ultimately, the pressures facing immigration adjudication
today-all-time highs in immigration court backlogs, all-time highs in
detention, twelve million individuals subject to potential detention
and removal, and woeful resource constraints across the immigration
courts-find their origins in deeper troubles in the immigration laws
that congressional intervention could remedy. Comprehensive
statutory reform, including paths to legalization for those who live in
the country without authorization, an expansion of statutory
eligibility for discretionary relief, and relaxation of rules related to
mandatory detention, could more meaningfully alleviate the forces
giving rise to procedures like stipulated orders of removal. Whether
Congress will act, however, remains unclear. Unless or until
legislative interventions take place, the agencies participating in
stipulated removal should refrain from exacerbating the problems in
an already broken system.
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